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DEDICATION.

These pages are dedicated to all humans, great and
small. To the great, because of their courage in running
and flying. And to the small, because of their cowardice in
dragging their feet. Without the great, the human race
would be lost into the mud. And without the small, it would
be lost into the vertigo,

,

Especially, I dedicate this labour to Heraclitos,

who reminded us that “everything is in flux", and to Socra
tes - that great philosopher - whose wisdom reached such a
l&ght as to make him say: “only one thing I learned in
life: my ignorance is limitless".

ii
/
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ABSTRACT
THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE SOCIOBRAIN

by
Andreas Constantinides

The subject of this study is the relationship between
the individual and society as studied by sociobiology, the
social sciences (specifically, sociology and anthropology),
and philosophy.

At first, the premises of sociobiology are presented,
i
with the main focus on Edward 0. Wilson1s Sociobiology: The
New Synthesis (1975a), which is regarded, anonymously, as
the “bible” of the new discipline. In addition to Wilson, on
r

the side of sociobiology, the views of David P. Barash(1977)
and Pierre L. van den Berghe (gregory, 1978:33-52), are pre
sented and discussed.

,,

In the process, the claim of sociobiology that “beha
vior and social structure, like all other biological pheno
mena, can'be studied as ‘organs,1 extensions of the genes
that exist because of their superior adaptive value” (Wil
son, 1975a:22), is contrasted with the dominant sociological
and anthropological views that social phenomena (including
social behavior), can be studied only at the level of the
social realm. Among the sociologists examined are Auguste
v

iii
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Corate, Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim. On the side of
anthropology, the arguments come from Marshal Sahlins (1977)
who emphasizes the "fact of Culture". From the domain of
philosophy (some would say - still - anthropology), the view
\

of Teilhard de Chardin, as presented in his book The Pheno
menon of Man (1955)» and the view of Michael Ruse (1-979) >
are discussed. In addition, the arguments of several biolo
gists (Waddington, Wald, Miller and Weiss), and those of The
Sociobiology Study Group of the Science for the People are
presented.

The discussion brings out the fact that the arguments
'
,
'
presented are a continuation, as Barash suggests, of one of
the oldest and "least productive" debates in the history of
science, namely, the debate concerned with the underlying
t

causes of behavior which is manifested in the conflict described, variously, as instinct versus learning, nature ver
sus nurture, or endogenous versus exogenous control of be
havior (Barash, 1977:39)*

But this discussion does not lead to the conclusion
that Barash - and sociobiology, in general - arrive at: that
"insofar as genes specify the organization of nerve cells,
just as they specify the organization of bone cells, there
is every reason to accept a role of genes in producing beha
vior, just as we accept a role of genes in producing stru
cture" (Barash, 1977:57).

.iv
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The conclusion is that Wilson, Barash and sociobio
logy, in general, see only one type of DNA: the one that
acts in such a way as to achieve an equilibrium between the
individual and his environment (both physical and social),
for the survival and reproduction of the individual human.
Sociobiology ignores, or -at least- downplays the importance
of another type of DNA: the one that acts in such a v/ay as
determine the nature of such an equilibrium; the DNA
which has as the sole purpose of its existence the survival
and reproduction of the human group: The Sociobrain. The
collective ways of acting or thinking which have, according
to Durkheim, a reality "outside" the individuals (Giddens,
1972:71), and which are manifested in philosophy, science,
arts, the communication media etc.).

In the past, because of the limited scope and the
simplicity of the social realm (Sociobrain), humans enjoyed
a high degree of independence (through, both the effortless
internalization of the social realm and its limited scope).
But, the expanding sophistication of the Sociobrain (espe
cially with regard to scientific and technological develop
ments), permits an individual human to master only a tiny
fraction of it, a fact which does not promote individuality
and creates a cybernetic relationship between the•individu
al and society based on the Dictatorship of the Sociobrain.
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PREFACE

One of the biggest questions of our time is v/hether
the individual human being should be left to act and think
in freedom or submit to the social demands* These choices
quite often go hand in hand and complement each other; how
ever, in many instances they conflict gravely*
l

In the past this conflict was displayed in philoso
phical doctrines, in general, and religious ideologies, in
particular: It is apparent, for example, in The Re-public of
Plato ^ , in which the author discusses "The virtues in the
%

State" (Plato, 1973:119-129), and "The virtues in the Indi
vidual" (pp* 139-1*0)• Aristotle is another of the pre-christian Greeks who dealt v/ith the relationship between the in
dividual and society in his book The Politics, in which he
suggested that man is "by nature a social being" and he,
according to Barnes,

pointed out the necessity of social rela
tions for the complete development of the
human personality, and he made plain the
abnormality of the non-social being (Bar
nes, 1970:8)*

Later on, this conflict is dealt v/ith by the Christivii
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an religion and the New Testament, whose authors, by empha
sizing the individuality of man (as an immortal soul), as
well as the brotherhood of man, managed - somehow - to sa
tisfy both positions.

,

During the last two hundred years, especially after
the publication of the Communist Manifesto, in l8Jf8, the
conflict became an integral part of political theorizing and
advocacy, under the following labels: Communism, Socialism,
National Socialism, Anarchism, Demecracy, Conservatism, Li
beralism, Social Democracy, New Left etc. In more recent ye
ars all these political ideologies have been polarized into
two opposing camps: On the one hand the ideology of Socia
lism (encompassing Communism), and on the other the ideolo
gies of Democracy and Liberalism with the common denominator
of individualism.

While this conflict occurs in the politicoeconomic
sphere, and philosophical pursuits, it is manifested in the
scientific realm as well. Scientific ideas with implications
relevant to the conflict originated in the middle of the
19th century with the publication of Auguste Comte*s Posi
tive Philosophy (1858) and Charles Darwin*s The OrifdLns of
\

Species (1859). Both writers v/ere dealing with human nature,
in general, and - in particular - the nature of the group
(the former), and the nature of the individual (the latter).
/
viii
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Comte

p

, beleived that the Vreal" human existence

began "by its extension from the individual to the colle
ctive organism" (Comte, 1875:825-826), and he argues that,
likewise, the beiQ.f in the rule of God (Theocracy) and the
worship of God (Theolatry), both characteristics of Theolo
gy, should be replaced by the rule and the worship of Soci
ety (Sociocracy and Sociolatry), values derived from the
practice of sociology (p.326).

By using what he calls Positive Philosophy ^ , Comte
arrives at the conclusion that the European history ^ went
through three great epochs: a) Speculative life, b) Active
life and c) Affective life, representing - in the same or
der - Intellect, Energy and Feeling

. These three "essen

tial modes of human existence" (Comte, 1875:325) , were "har
irioniously united "under the primitive systems of theocracy"
but "that unity, becoming soon oppressive, long ago ceased,
and has never yet been restored" (p.325)* Comte sees the
■19th century as ripe time for the "restoration" of this uni
ty. He writes:

the time has arrived for the foundation of
a complete and final synthesis, in which a
wider sphere will be given for the simulta
neous action of Intellect, Energy, and Fe
eling, than each could separately find ei
ther in Greek civilisation, Roman citizen
ship, or Catholic-feudal discipline (Comte,
1875:325-326).

This "complete and final synthesis" is seen by Comte
ix
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as talcing place not in any kind of "primitive system of the
ocracy", but in the reigning of the "permanent government
of Humanity" (p.325)* The Great Being of God is replaced, in
this "final religion" (p.326), by the Great Being of Huma
nity (p.327).

The final synthesis, which is brought about by the
establishment of Humanity as the supreme being, is based on
£
"definite laws" (p.328), which can be demonstrated
. And
the- onus of the demonstration of these laws falls on the
shoulders of a new discipline which Comte christened socio
logy (sociologie).

In order to arrive at the demonstrable laws of soci
ology, Comte discusses Positive Philosophy, of which he
distinguishes two aspects: 1) Cosmology, which is occupied
with the study of "the whole group of inorganic science",
and 2) Biology, the "study of life" (Comte, 1873:355). The
author regards both Cosmology and Biology as "introductory
principles", and as "the twofold basis of the great final
study, that of Humanity" (p.355). And as he sees an "inva
riability of external relations" in both Cosmology and Bio
logy, he does, likewise, in his examination of Humanity
(p.356):

Comte*s examination of Humanity, or his study of the
"Social Physics", begins with his belief that "Humanity suc-

.x
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ceeds to Animality, as Animality to Vegetality” , a princible
which he sees, in “its synthetic form*1, as the “Hierarchy of
life” . And he regards these modes (Vegetality, Animality and
Humanity), as the "trible foundation” on which the analyti
cal processes of life should rest. Without this foundation,
/

Comte states, there is the danger of falling into ”specula
tions” and “interminable disputes” in the examination of Hu
manity. And the same confusion occurs,
tempt forthe examination

if there is an at

of Animality without its relation

to Humanity. He writes:

We shall inevitably fall into vague and use
less speculations and interminable disputes,
if we attempt to construct the second term,
the series of animal life, independently of
the first and of the final term. To do so
would be to build at once without foundation
and without purpose (Comte, 1875:501)*
•

i

«

The transition from the animal to the human, or so
cial mode of existence, is seen by Comte as “even more di
rect and definite” and consisting “simply in development of
the internal functions of the brain” (p.501). The develop
ment of the internal functions of the brain is discussed by
Comte in the concepts of Egoism and Altruism (p.558). Ego
ism is a characteristic of the personal Affective Life
which is found “in the very lowest forms of life, those in
which there is no separation, or incomplete separation, of
sexes", and Altruism is a characteristic of the social Af
fective Life, which is exhibited by man as well as by “most
r
\

xi
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of the higher animals" (p.558)*

•fitrfe Although Comte sees this connection between Ve' getality, Animality and Humanity, as well as the limits im
posed by the "constant and irresistible pressure of the en
vironment" on the living organism*s "tendency to vary" (p.
t

357)» he ignored them when dealing with the abstract theo
ries of sociology. He writes:

Ultimately no doubt the sociologist will
have to take careful cognisance of such
conditions as those of climate and of
race, which when dealing with the abstract
theories of sociology, I have systemati
cally kept out of sight (p.353)*

Comte did not find it necessary to deal with environ
mental and genetic ("racial11) factors, although he saw so
ciological science as "incomplete" without them (p.353). And
he urged "those high intellects" who are called to a "sacer
dotal mission" to devote themselves to questions of Sociocracy and Sociolatry, of which he says:

Intellectually both fields of practical
enquiry are inexhaustible, and morally
they are most valuable. The improvement
of our conduct, private or public, and
above all, the elevation of"the feelings
from which it springs, are studies open
to all and yet offering problems for the
strongest minds (pp.353-35 k ) •

Corate was a practical scientist (his elaboration of
xii
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Positive Philosophy and of Social Physics makes this undisputable), but he was a revolutionary thinker, as well, who
was reacting to the religious doctrines of his time (Theo
cracy and Theolatry). This inevitably led him to emphasize
the need for the individual to submit to the rule and wor
ship of society (Sociocracy and Sociolatry), at the expense
of more elaborate scientific pursuits with regard to the na
tural relationship between the environment and the indivi
dual and the individual and society (what Comte calls vegetality, animality and humanity).

But what was not emhasized by Comte (environmental
and biological factors), it became the central theme of
O

Q

Charles Darwin ' and Herbert Spencer

. Darwin attempted

to explain human nature as the result of an organic evolu
tionary process subject to natural selection not unlike
that of other animals, and Spencer saw the individual as a
distinct part of the social group. Although Spencer compares
society to an organism ^ with characteristics similar to
those of the individual human, he writes that,

The defective natures of citizens will show
themselves in the bad acting of whatever so
cial structure they are arranged into. There
is no political alchemy by which you can get
golden conduct out of leaden instincts (Spen
cer, 1893:333)*
Comte*s introduction of sociology as a discipline
studying the "definite laws" of Humanity (Comte, 1873:328),

xiii
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did not bring about the demise of theology (theocracy and
theolatry). Still, in the last quarter of the twentieth cenbury, there are those v;ho worship God and believe in creation

in

. Sociologists followed Comte*s suggestion to deal,

primarily, with questions of sociocracy and sociolatry, and
ignored - altogether - his caution that "ultimately no doubt
the sociologist will have to take careful cognisance of such
conditions as those of climate and of race" (Comte, 1875:
553). Sociologists ignored Comte*s important postulate that
cosmology and biology are "the twofold basis of the great
final study, that of Humanity" (p*355).
\

What sociologists ignored became the focus of evolu
tionary biology, which built on Darwin's evolutionary theo
ry. Recently (in 1975), the biologist Edward 0. Wilson pub
lished a book titled Sociobiology; The Hew Synthesis, in
which he postulates a relationship between the biological
base of an organism and its social behavior. The "final syn
thesis11 of Comte in which "a wider sphere will be given for
the simultaneous action of Intellect, Energy, and Feeling11,
a sphere representing the "permanent government of Humanity"
(Comte, 1875:325-326), is transformed by Wilson into a "new
synthesis". There is a great distinction though; >Vhereas,
Comte sees Humanity as a "Great Being" regulated by "defi
nite lav/s'1, studied by sociology, Wilson looks at the "mo
rality of the gene" (1975a ^3 ), studied by evolutionary bio
logy (specifically its subdiscipline, sociobiology)^ to exxiv
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plain human social behavior. This distinction is the subject
of this study.

NOTES

1. The Republic of Plato, 1973. Especially in the chapters
entitled "The Virtues in the State” and "The Virtues in
the Individual” ,
2. The Positive Philosophy. 1858
3. John Stuart Mill summarizes as follows Positive Philoso
phy: "Positive Philosophy maintains that within the exist
ing order of the universe, or rather of the part of it
known to us, the direct determining cause of every pheno
menon is not supernatural but natural...........
Who
ever regards all eVents as parts of a constant order, each
one being the invariable consequent of some antecedent
condition, or combination of conditions, accepts fully the
Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or not
an universal antecedent on which the whole system of na
ture was originally consequent, and whether that universal
antecedent is conceived as an Intelligence or not (Mill,
1965:15).
Comte regards the people of the rest of the world as "po
pulations of less advanced growth” , in comparison with the
civilisation of the "regenerated West” (Comte, 1875:353).
5. The speculative life (intellect), is seen by Comte as the
essence of the Greek civilisation, the active life (ener
gy), represents the Roman citizenship, and the affective
life (feeling), the Catholic-feudal discipline (pp.325-

326) .

6. This prompts Comte to call, alternatively, the new reli
gion as "Religion of Demonstration" (p.337).
7. In The Origin of Species.(1859)■
8. The Social Organism, (i860).
xv
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9* The Social Organism, (1860)
10. The reference here is to the legal suit brought by Kel
ly Segraves, 11the Baptist head of a group promoting the
Biblical version of creation11, against the California
Department of Education demanding the teaching, in
schools of divine creation (Globe and Mail newspaper,
June 20, 1981:12), Toronto, Canada.

xvi
/
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INTRODUCTION

In defining sociobiology, Wilson 0975a:*f) writes
, that it is "the study of the "biological basis of all social
behavior11, and it is formulated by the integration of pre
cepts of evolutionary biology into modern population biolo

gy (1975aslf).

Central concepts in modern population biology (con
cepts which have been adopted "by sociobiology), are kin se
lection and reciprocal altruism (pp.117-120). The importance
of these concepts is due to the fact that they transfer the
unit of natural selection from the individual organism to
\

the group, a transfer which "solves11 what is described by
Wilson as the "central" theoretical problem of sociobiology:
"how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fit1

I
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ness, possibly evolve by natural selection?’* (p.3).

Besides kin selection and reciprocal altruism, natu
ral selection is another concept taken over by sociobiology
from the area of modern population biology (or ’’neo-Darwin
ist evolutionary theory” , as Wilson calls it - p.Jf)* Natu
ral selection is defined as ’’the change in relative frequ
ency in genotypes due to differences in the ability of
their phenotypes to obtain representation in the next gene
ration” (p.67)* In order to emphasize the importance of the
"dogma” of natural selection in evolutionary biology (of
which sociobiology is a branch - p.4)» Wilson writes:

The pervasive role of natural selection in
shaping all classes of traits in organisms
can be fairly called the central dogma of
evolutionary biology. When relentlessly
pressed, this proposition may not produce
an absolute truth, but it is, as G.C. Wil
liams disarmingly put the matter, the light
and the v;ay, A large part of the contribu
tion of Konrad Lorenz and his fellow etho
logists can be framed in the same metaphor.
They convinced us that behavior and social
structure, like all other biological pheno
mena, can be studied as ’organs,1 extensions
of the genes that exist because of their
superior adaptive value (Wilson, 1975a:21-22).

Natural selection is ’’relentlessly” pressed in soci
obiology. And it is not only regarded as the process by
which ’’prolonged individual survival” and ’’superior mating
performance” (survival and reproduction), are selected. Na
tural selection is extended to behavior and social stru-
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3
cture, as well as to "complex social behaviors" (p.3)- Such
complex social behaviors are seen by'Wilson as those depen
dent on love, hate, aggression, fear, expansiveness etc, (p,
k )• Wilson suggests, iri essence,

that natural selection

se

lection "selected" the genes that were capable of love, hate
e'tc., and the uncapable ones perished. So, by analysing the
existing genes (by "tearing down the machinery" - p.575)» it
would be possible'for social behavior to be explained in
terms of the properties of the cells. He writes:

stress will be evaluated in terms of the neurophysiological perturbations and their rela
xation times. Cognition will be translated
into circuity. Learning and creativeness ’will
be defined as the alteration of specific por
tions of the cognitive machinery regulated by
input from the emotive centers (p.573)»

Critics of Wilson’s ideas,and postulates, concerning
sociobiology do not accept this role of the genes in determinig behavior, especially in the case of the humans. One
'i
such a critic is C.H. V/addington
. V/addington notes that
Wilson

is broad-minded enough to bring out the fact,
which most orthodox evolutionists try to keep
in decent obscurity, that selection operates
directly on phenotypes, that is to say on or
ganisms after they have been affected during
their development by the environment as well
as by the genes they contain (Caplan, 1978:

256).

\

But the importance of phenotypic adaptation, according

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

k

to V/addington, ’'hardly gets a mention" by Y/ilson beyond the
"early introductory part of his book, and when in the main
text gets down to cases" (p.256). V/addington sees this as a
"defect" of V/ilson, and he is asking for more emphasis on
"phenotypic adaptation", which is "another way of refferring
to learning" and a phrase "broad enough to encompass modifi
cation of physical structure as well as of behavior" (p.256).
The author sees learning and the "topic of communication" as
a "much more central issue in sociobiology than the problem
of altruism". And.he concludes:
/

If one is going to discuss the evolution of
social behavior with the aim of bringing it
into connection with human social behavior,
which is almost wholly learned, then ’learn
ing, ' and the genetic basis for learning,
must have an absolutely central position in
the argument (p.256).

Ek’ora an anthropological point of view, Marshal Sah1

lins

2

sees sociobiology as ignoring the "fact of culture".

According to Sahlins, culture is "biology plus the symbolic
faculty", and a "theory of meaning" is needed to'explain
culture and not biology. And he sees biology, or any other
"law of nature" (physical and chemical laws), as relating
to a "fact of culture",

only as a limit does to a form, a constant
to a difference, and a matrix to a practice.
It will never be possible to explain the
cultural properties of any such fact by re
ferring it to underlying contents of a dif-
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ferent order (Sahlins,1977:65-66).

Another critic of sociobiology, biologist George
v
Wald ^ , writes the following:
f

What impresses me most about the new socio
biology is its massive irrelevance to the
present human condition. It is a little late
to begin tracing our present state and its
problems back to genetic sources. The genes
are only permissive. We exploit our genetic
potentialities less and less as we assume
more and more specialized roles in more and
more urbanized, mechanized, and industria
lized societies. The limiting factors in
modern human performance are primarily so
cial, economic, and political (Gregory,
1978:277).

In this study, the positions and postulates of socio
biology - especially, human sociobiology - will be consider
ed, and relevant criticisms will be examined, with a view at
synthesizing the opposing views.

NOTES
1. “Mindless Societies” , The Sociobiology Debate. 1978.
2. The Use and Abuse of Biology. 1977
5. "The Human Condition” , Sociobiology and Human Nature.
1978.
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THE ESSENCE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY

The general term "sociobiology", according to Edward
O* V/ilson ^ was used independently by John P. Scott in 19^6
and by Charles F. Hockett in 19^8, but the word was not
picked up immediately by others* In 1950, Scott, who had
been serving as secretary of the small but influential Com
mittee for the Study of Animal Behavior, suggested sociobi
ology more formally as a term for the

interdisciplinary science which lies be
tween the fields of biology (particular
ly ecology and pphysiology) and psycho
logy and sociology (Gregory, 1978:3).

When V/ilson, in 1975* published his controversial
book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in which he suggested
that a discrete discipline should be built on a "foundation
of genetics and population biology" (p.3)> he selected the
term sociobiology rather than some other, novel expression,
because he "believed it would already be familiar to most
6
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7
students of animal behavior and hence more likely to be ac
cepted" (p.3).

The terra sociobiology may has been accepted, but the
acceptance of the essence of Wilson's book is highly ques
tionable: According to Marshal Sahlins 2 , Wilson's book

has occasioned a crisis of connaissance and
conscience, of knowledge and public con
sciousness, with overtones as much politi
cal or ideological as they have been acade
mic (Sahlins, 1977:)*
/

—

Numerous books and articles have been published in
support", or repudiation of the positions taken by Wilson.
\

The framework in which sociobiology is discussed by
Wilson is the neo-Darwinian evolutionary.theory: evolutio
nary biology integrated in "modern population biology" (Wil
son, 1975a:*f). Central concepts in modern population biology
are kin selection and reciprocal altruism (pp.117-120). The
' importance of these concepts is due to their transfering of
the unit of natural selection from the individual organism
to the group and, thereby, "solving" what is described by
Wilson as the "central" theoretical problem of socioliology: "how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal
fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?-" (p.3) •

Wilson sees William D. Hamilton as the person who
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launched the "modern theory of altruism, selfishness, and
spite" which, through the concept of inclusive fitness ^ ,
led to the theory of kin selection, according to which,

blood relatives cooperate or bestow altru
istic favors on one another in a way that
increases the average genetic fitness ofthe members of the network as a whole, even
when this behavior reduces the individual
fitness of certain members of the group
(Wilson, 1975a:117).

The concept of reciprocal altruism was initiated by
Robert L. Trivers ^ , and deals with altruism manifested among individuals without blood relations between them: The
"good Samaritan behavior in human beings" (p.120), Recipro
cal altruism suggests that the "good Samaritan" has "much to
gain by his act". This concept is based on the assumption
that the altruist anticipates a future payoff to his altru
istic act (reciprocity), which will be much greater than his
own offering, since the ob.ject in an altruistic act gains
more -with regard to his fitness <*■ than the subject loses
with regard to his

. Wilson gives the example of a drown

ing man where the endangered individual has a one-half
chance of dying and the altruist (rescuer), a one-tenth
chance. And, the altruist, at present, risks a one-tenth
chance of losing his life in anticipation of benefiting from
a one-half chance of saving his life, on some possible time
in the future (p.120) • Wilson sees Trivers as "skillfully"
relating reciprocal altruism to a wide range of the most
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"subtle human behaviors":

Aggressively moralistic behavior, for ex
ample, keeps would-be cheaters in line no less than hortatory sermons to the be
lievers. Self-righteousness, gratitude,
and sympathy enhance the probability of
receiving an altruistic act by virtue of
implying reciprocation. The all-important
quality of sincerity is a metacommunica
tion about the significance of these mes
sages. The emotion of guilt may be favored
in natural selection because it motivates
the cheater to compensate for his misdeed
and to provide convincing evidence that he
does not plan to cheat again (p.120).

Besides kin selection and reciprocal altruism, natu
ral selection is another premise taken over by sociobiology
from the neo-Darwinian

evolutionary theory. Natural sele

ction is defined as "the change in relative frequency in ge
notypes due to differences in the ability of their pheno
types to obtain representation in the next generation (Wil
son, 1975a:67)* The change in the relative frequencies in
genotypes, or "the variation in competence", according to
the premise of natural selection,

can stem from many causes: different abi
lities in direct competition with other
genotypes; differential survival under the
onslaught of parasites, predators, and
changes in the physical environment; vari
able reproductive competence; variable ability to penetrate new habitats; and so
forth (p.67).

The role of natural selection in shaping all classes
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of traits in organism, according to Wilson, can not be overestimated. He sees natural selection as the “central dogma"
of evolutionary biology, vihich, v/hen relentlessly pressed,

this proposition may not produce an abso
lute truth, but it is, as G.C. Williams
disarmingly put the matter, the light and
the way. A large part of the contribution
of Konrad Lorenz and his fellow etholo-;
gists can be framed in the same metaphor.
They convinced us that behavior and social
structure, like all other biological phe
nomena, can be studied as ‘organs,* exten
sions of the genes that exist because of
their superior adaptive value (Wilson,
1975:21-22) 7 .

The introduction of the concepts of kin selection and
family selection salvages, according to Wilson, the old Dar
winian theory of biological evolution and natural selection,
O
in contrast to the Lamarckian
evolutionary theory which
does not “recover" from its “inability" to explain the exis
tence of sterile organisms (Wilson, 1975a:117) ^ . Although
the unit of natural selection, with the introduction of the
neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, was transfered from the
individual organism to the kin (and by the reciprocal altru
ism to a social group), the level of the selection still remains, unwaveringly

10

, the gene of the individual organism.

The importance of the gene:

The most basic element of examination in sociobiolo
gy is the gene. The gene, defined by Wilson as "the basic
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unit of heredity" (Wilson, 1975a:585), is composed of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid), which is “the basic hereditary ma
terial of all kinds of organisms" (p.582)* In higher orga
nisms, including animals, "the great bulk of DNA is located
within the chromosomes" (p.382), which are found in the nu
cleus of a cell. The larger unit is the cell. The cell is
composed of many parts (lysosome, nuclear membrane, endo
plasmic reticulum etc.). One part of the cell is the nucle
us where the chromosomes reside. And within the chromosomes
there are the genes which are composed of DNA.

In order to emphasize the importance of the genes in
the sociobiologicalexplanation of
says

thatindividual organisms

social behavior, Wilson

are "only" a vehicle for

the

genes, and "part of an elaborate device to preserve and
spread them with the least possible biochemical perturbation
(Wilson, 1975a.:3)* In order to disperse any doubts about his
position he continues:

Samuel Butler*s famous aphorism, that the
chicken is only an egg's way of making another egg, has been modernized: the orga
nism is only DNA's way of maiding more DNA.
More to the point, the hypothalamus and
limbic system are engineered to perpetu
ate DNA (p.3).

The genes - as well as the hypothalamus and limbic
system - evolve, according to Wilson, by "natural sele
ction".. And this "simple** biological statement "must be pur-
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sued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths" (Wilson,
1975a:3).

A Rudimentary Science:

Sociobiology, according to Wilson, is still a "rudi
mentary" science, and "its relavance to human social sys
tems is still largely unexplored" (Gregory, 1978:12), Wil
son does not see biology reaching its "peak" before the
"end of the twenty-first century" (Wilson, 1975:57^)* And,

only when the machinery can be torn down
on paper at the level of the cell and put
together again will the properties of emotion and ethical judgement come clear
(P.575).

i

After the machinery is torn down (read: analysis of

DNA and identification of loci), Wilson suggests,

simulations can then be employed to esti
mate the full range of behavioral respon
ses and the precision of their homeostatic
- controls (p,575) 11 •
\

In "tearing" down the machinery, V/ilson says, the ro
le of evolutionary sociobiology will be twofold:
It will attempt to reconstruct the history
of the machinery and to identify the adap-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
tive significance of each of its func
tions.
.The second contribution
of evolutionary sociobiology will be to
monitor the genetic basis of social be
havior (p.373)*

In doing his part in reconstructing the "history of
the machinery", in identifying the "adaptive significance of
each of its functions", and in monitoring "the genetic basis
of social behavior", Wilson attempts a "general synthesis"
of the available knowledge with regard to population biolo
gy, invertebrate zoology, including entomology especially,
and vertebrate zoology - including humans (p.v).

- At first, Wilson constructs several "elementary con
cepts of sociobiology" ranging from definitions of society
and the individual organism to the specification of such
common social behavior as communication and coordination
(Wilson, 1975a:7-31)

12

. These concepts apply indiscrimi

nately to verterbrates (including humans) and invertebrates.
And he proceeds by making "an attempt to codify sociobiology
into a branch of evolutionary biology and particularly of
modern population biology" (p.4) ^

.

Wilson sees the theory of sociobiology as deriving,
in general terms, from the study of the "evolutionary and ecological parameters" (Historical constrains, environmental
factors, intensity of environmental fluctuation, which lead
- in their totality - to the theory of evolutionary ecolo-
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gy), combined with the population parameters (individual
birth and death schedules, equilibrial population densities,
gene flow between populations, coefficients of relation
ships), and the behavioral parameters (raodiflability of in
dividual behavior) (V/ilson, 1975:5)*
)

Human Sociobiology;

Employing the concepts presented earlier (kin sele, ction, natural selection etc.), and taking into considera
tion the ecological parameters, population parameters, and
behavioral parameters, V/ilson examines the social behavior
of such diverse organisms as fruit flies, starlings, mon
keys etc. But these examinations are irrelevant to the pre
sent study (at least, in their specificity). This study is
concerned with human sociobiology.

With regard to humans, Wilson distinguishes social
evolution in two stages relating to the *'acceleration in
mental evolution” (Wilson, 1975a:565)* The firts stage "occured during the transition from a larger arboreal primate
to the first man-apes (Australopithicus)” , which change
”may have required as much as ten million years” and culmi
nated between five and three million years ago (p.565)- The
second, ”much more rapid phase of acceleration began about
100.000 years ago” and it, according to Wilson,
consisted primarily of cultural evolution
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and must have been mostly phenotypic in
nature, building upon the genetic poten
tial in the brain that had accumulated
over the previous millions of years. The
brain had reached a threshold, and a
wholly new, enormously more rapid form
of mental evolution took over (p.565).

The change from a larger "arboreal primate" (Ramapi'thecus), to Australopithicus and from there to humans is
attributed by V/ilson to the change of habitat. Whereas Ramapithicus "lived in forests and was adapted for progression
through trees by arm swinging", man - together with "a very
few other large-bodied primates" - left the forest "to spend
most of their lives on the ground in open habitats" (V/ilson,
1975a:566-567)• Proceeding from here, and adopting "fossil
evidence, extrapolations back from extant hunter-gatherer
societies, and comparisons with other living primate spe
cies" (p,567), V/ilson subscribes to the autocatalysis model,
which,

holds that when the earliest hominids be-’
came bipedal as part of their terrestrial
adaptation, their hands were freed, the
manufacture and handling of artifacts was
made easier, and intelligence grew as part
of the improvement of the tool-using habit.
V/ith mental capacity and the tendency to
use artifacts increasing through mutual re
inforcement, the entire materials-based
culture expanded (pp,567-563)•

Natural selection and evolution continues, always ac
cording to Wilson, to transform man. The "increase in brain
size" and the refinement of stone artifacts "indicate a g r a -
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dual improvement in mental capacity throughout the Pleisto
cene" (p.569)* And v/ith the appearance of the Mousterian
tool culture of Homo sapiens nearderthalensis some 75*000
years ago,
\

the trend gathered momentum, giving way in
Europe to the Upper Paleolithic culture of
Homo sapiens about /j-0.000 years B.P* Start
ing about 10.000 years ago agricultulture
was invented and spread, populations in
creased enormously in density, and the pri
mitive hunter-gatherer bands gave way lo
cally to the relentless growth of tribes,
chiefdoms, and states. Finally, after A.D.
1if00 European-based civilizations shifted
gears again, and knowledge and technology
grew not just exponentially but superexponentially (p.569).
J

The first stage in mental evolution - from Ramapithecus to Australopithecus - was, according to V/ilson, a result
of the change of habitat and, as such, it was environmental
ly induced "no different from those that have guided the so
cial evolution of other animal species” (p57^). The second
stage "in which the most distinctive human qualities emer
ged”, is seen by Wilson as "depending" more on "internal re
organization and less on direct responses to features in the
surrounding environment" (p.57^). But, in making this dis
tinction, the author emphasizes that he does not wish to im
ply that social evolution became independent of the size and
density of the population (demography), and the natural environment:
The iron laws of demography still clamped
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down on the spreading hominid populations,
and the most spectacular cultural advances
were impelled by the invention of new ways
to control the environment (p.57*f)*

These are, in a summary, the main tenets of human so
ciobiology - as expressed by Edward 0. V/ilson in his book
oociobiology: The New Synthesis, Later on, as a response to
several^ criticisms, the author elaborated on his positions,
and added certain modifications. But this will be part of
the discussion in a section presented later. Nov/ the focus
shifts to V/ilson*s - and human sociobiology*si in general critics.

NOTES

1. "Introduction: V/hat is Sociobiology", In Michael S. Gre
gory’s Sociobiology and Human Nature. 1978 (pp.1-12).
2. The Use and Abuse of Biology. 1977
3. "The sum of an individual’s own fitness plus the sum of
all the effects it causes to the related parts of the
fitnesses of all its relatives" (V/ilson, 1975^:118).
k*

"The Evolution of Reciprocal.Altruism", in Quarterly Re
view of Biology. 1971, 46 (4-)’:35-57

3* Like depositing money in a bank or investing in shares in
anticipation of increasing one's capital (one’s fitness
in our*case). But V/ilson’s example of the drowning man
and the rescuer, further on, seems senseless indeed. In
reality, the rescuer risks one-tenth chance v/ith a chance
of an unknown quality. It would make sense to say that he
risks one-tenth, at present, for a possible gain of onehalf, in the future, if he had a ten percent chance (or
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risk), to find himself in the place of the victim, some
. time in the future. For example, if ten percent of the
hum&n population were in a drowning situation some time
during their life-time.
6. Natural selection is a premise of the old Darwinian evolutionaty theory, as well, but v/ith the distinction that
the unit of selection is the individual organism instead
of the kin.
7. The "superior adaptive value" is used, apparently, as a
replacement of the "survival of the fittest" (see index
- fitness - p.675)» in &n obvious attempt of avoiding
identification v/ith Spencer. Note, as well, the idea of
"behavior and social structure" viewed as "extensions of
the genes", an idea on which the critics base their op
position to V/ilson.
8. The Lamarckian theory "requires characters to be deve
loped by use or disuse of the organs of individual or
ganisms and then to be passed directly to the next gene
ration, an impossibility when the organisms are sterile"
(Wilson, 1975^:117)* David P. Barash in his Sociobiology
and Behavior,(1977). presents a vivid example of the
contrast between the Darwinian and Lamarckian theories
of evolution. The author gives - on the Lamarckian sidethe example of the "unsuccessful" technique used by Ly
senko "to breed winter-resistant grain by exposing seed
lings to cold, allowing them to mature and produce seed,
then exposing the next generation of seedlings to cold
again and so on" (Barash, 1977:29)* On the Darwinian
side, the author gives the example of the successful
plant breeders whereas "plants are exposed to cold, af
ter which those individuals that show themselves to be
most resistant are chosen (selected), and cross-fertili
zed among themselves, producing the next generation (p.
29).
In a summary, in the Lamarckian evolutionary the
ory genes, or combinations of genes (in general, geno
types), of all individual organisms are thought to have
equal chance of surviving under certain environmental
conditions once they are exposed to them for an adequate
time period. The important variable is the equal ot>nor- •
tunity given in order to acquire- characteristics fit for
survival. In the Darwinian evolutionary theory, equal
opportunity is of no consequence. Even if all genotypes
are given equal opportunity to acquire characteristics
fit for survival, only part of the. total number of geno
types will be selected (survive and reproduce), because
of their ingrained (genetic) differential ability for
survival.
9. The conflict betv/een the Darwinian and the Lamarckian e-
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volutionary theories lies at the heart of the arguments
against sociobiology (especially, as it will be shown
later on, the arguments of the "Sociobiology Study
Group of the Science for the People"). V/ilson takes,
squarely, the Darwinian position (Wilson, 1975:*f, 6364), and he regards natural selection as the "central
dogma" of evolutionary biology: "The pervasive role of
natural selection in shaping all classes of traits in
organisms can be fairly called the central dogma of evo
lutionary biology" (pp.21-22). And since sociobiology is
a sub-discipline of evolutionary biology (p.4), natural
selection becomes the "central dogma" of sociobiology,
as well.
10. If natural selection is examined at the level of the
group, it is only plain logic for the adaptive (fittest)
gene to be examined as a group gene. The genes of the
individual organism contribute only in part to the sur
vival, or the fitness of the group (so, they are only
partly adaptive). The example of the sterile organism
(Wilson, 1975:117), will suffice: The sterile organism,
as an individual, it is not fit to exist since it lacks
the most important characteristic (alongside survival),
of determining fitness, i.e. reproduction ability. It is
(the organism) produced and it reproduces as part of the
group. The concept of kin selection may be help the sur
vival of the Darwinian theory, but it is against the sociobiological theory.
11. This will result, according to Wilson, in the explanation
of stress, cognition, learning etc. He writes: "Stress
will be evaluated in terms of the neurophysiological per
turbations and their relaxation times. Cognition will be
translated into circuity. Learning and creativeness will
be defined as the alteration of specific portions of the
cognitive machinery regulated by input from the emotive
centers (Wilson, 1975^:575)•
12. No useful purpose is served in delving in these concepts
here, since they do not have any bearing in this discus
sion, or in any of the criticisms v/ith regard to socio
biology.
13. This "attempt" is undertaken, as it is mentioned earlier,
within the neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory enriched by
the concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, as
well as of natural selection.
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THE CRITICS OF HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY

V/ilson* s Sociobiology: The' New Synthesis has not **oc
casioned a crisis of connaissance and conscience" . as Sah
lins says (1977:x), as a result of dealing with sociobiology
in general, which"consists mostly of zoology. About 90 per
cent of its current material concerns animals11 (Gregory,
1978:2)

• V/ilson *s expertise in population biology and in

vertebrate zoology has been praised by both proponents and
critics

p

. The "crisis" arose out of the human sociobiolo

gy in the last section of V/ilson* s book which "culminates in
a discussion of humanity as the most developed of the social
species*' (Caplan, 1978:277) ^ •

In a letter sent to Gerald Holton, as a response to
a draft version of his paper "The New Synthesis" (Gregory,
1978:75-97)* Alexander Morin, of the National Science Foun
dation suggests three reasons for "the crisis of connais- •
sance and conscience occasioned by sociobiology" (or what
Morin calls " g u t reaction." against sociobiology). These rea-

20
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sons, according to Morin, are the following:
•

First, sociobiology denies two essential eleraents of the Greco-Judaic tradition:
mind-body dualism and the special creation
of man.......................... ...........
Second, sociobiology violates Durkheim's
injunction - which is bedrock in the train
ing of social scientists in this country that social phenomena can only be explained
in terras of social variables...............
Third, sociobiology has implications (and
may ultimately provide conclusions) that
contradict the notion of the perfectibility
of man, which is a fundamental assumption
in the dominant political ideology of.sci
ence as it has developed in the V/est (Gre
gory, 1978:82).

V/ith such ramifications, it was only natural for so
ciobiology to stimulate criticisms from a wide range of cirI

cles (biology, social sciences, philosophy). Below, repre
sentative criticisms from thse disciplines will be presen
ted:

Critics VJithin the Biological Discipline:

•C. H. V/addington * , as it is mention elsewhere,
praises Wilson's work with regard to its relevance in the
of
explanation of the social behavior/animals "from the most
primitive types such as corals, through insects, fishes,
>birds, to the many varieties of mammals and primitive man"
(Caplan, 1978:25^)* But when the discussion is turned to
the modern man, V/addington expresses strong reservations
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about the relevance of sociobiology. He disagrees with Wil
son that the "central" theoretical problem in.sociobiology
is altruism. This problem, he says, was raised, and the es
sential solution of it provided, "more than forty years ago" (p.25*f) ^ • What is seen by V/addington as the central
problem facing sociobiology is "the whole topic of communi
cation among individuals and all the many forms in which it
\

may be carried out" (p.257).

Two more features in sociobiology that are seen as
"weak" by V/addington, are a) the reciprocal interaction be
tween behavior and selection, and b) the absence of any
•

mention of mind, mentality, purpose, goal, aim, or "any
word of similar connotation"in sociobiology. V/ith regard to
to the "reciprocal interaction between behavior and sele
ction", V/addington states:-

, To a major extent, animals lose out in se
lection, not so much for doing the wrong
thing, but for their inefficiency in per
forming whatever it is they are doing. The
nature of the selection is to a very large
degree dictated by the nature of their be
havior (Caplan, 1978:257).

The question of mentality is regarded by the author
as "the weakest feature in the whole grand structure which
Wilson has built up" (p.257). And he concludes:

I think one is bound to come to the con-
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elusion that the sociobiologists are just
*running scared* of ferocious philoso
phers* A fev; years ago it may have been
tactically wise for quiet behavioral sci
entists to practice their own distraction
procedures against the threat of predato
ry positivists, but I doubt if there is
any longer any need for such super-caution
(p.238).

George Wald ^ is another biologist who wants the pro
. cess of communicating and interacting between humans to be
emphasized. He sees the genes as “only permissive1* and he
identifies as “limiting factors'* the social, economic, and
t

political climate which imposes specialized roles in more
and more urbanized, mechanized, and industrialized socie
ties:

The genes are only permissive. Vie exploit
our genetic potentialities less and less
as we assume more and more specialized ro
les in more and more urbanized, and indus
trialized societies. The limiting factors
in modern human performance are primarily
social, economic,and political, (Gregory,
> 1978:277).
V/ald accepts the premise that man has “an animal he
ritage of behavior", but he says that "by now large portions
of it have become inappropriate to civilized life" (p,277).

An additional exmple of the opposition to V/ilson* s
sociobiology was a letter published in The New York Review
of Books (November 13, 1975:182, l8/f-186) 7 , titled »Against *Sociobioly*", and signed by Elizabeth Allen et al.
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(the "al." represents 15 co-signers who were, in general,
professors of biology, psychology, anthropology and corapa*
8
rative zoology at Harvard University)
. I n this letter,
the authors see V/ilson1s book as “the latest attempt to reinvigorate" Herbert Spencer1s “survival of the fittest”
which proclaims “the primacy of natural selection in deter
mining most important characteristics of human behavior”
(Caplan, 1978:259)* The authors see this as resulting to a
"deterministic view of human societies and human action”
and associate it with eugenecists "such as Davenport” who ■
suggested that "deviant" behavior - criminality, alcoholism,
etc. - are genetically based, as well as with the “more re
cent claims for a genetic basis of racial differences in
*

intelligence by Arthur Jensen, V/illiam Shockley and others"
(pp.259-260)•
v

Allen et al. write that the reason for the survival
of these "recurrent” deterministic theories is that they
"consistently" tend to provide a "genetic justification of
the status quo and of existing privileges for certain groups
according to class, race or sex" (p.260). As examples of
this, the authors give John D. Rockefeller*s Sr. saying that
"the growth of large business is merely a survival of the
fittest....It is merely the working out of a law of nature
and a law of God", and the "eugenics policies which led to
the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany" (p.260).
In a later date, the same group (which by now its mem-
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bership increased from 16 to 35) published in BioScience
(March, 1976), an article titled “.Another Biological Determinism", in which they continue their criticisms of socio
biology mostly on the same lines. They say for exmple that
the "outlines of human nature are viewed myopically, through
the lens of modern Euro-American culture" (Caplan, 1978:
282) ^ # 23Ut this time, the authors deal more v/ith the sub.stance of V/ilson1s postulates and assumptions;

One of the important points they make is the distin
ction between analogy and homology, pointing out that V/il
son* s comparisons of the Homo sapiens with other animals v/ith regard to "universal features of behavior" - are based
on analogy (v/ith natural selection operating on different
genes of different species and resulting to the production
of convergent responses as independent adaptations to simi
lar environments - Caplan, 1978:28/f). The authors are ready
to accept only homology (evolved responses with identical
functions - like the "eyes of vertebrates and octopuses").
V/ilson, they say, "fails" in this area:

Here V/ilson fails badly, for his favorite
analogies arise by a twisted process of
imposing human institutions on animals by
metaphor, and then rederiving the human
institutions as special cases of the more
general phenomenon ‘discovered* in nature.
In this way human institutions suddenly
become ‘natural* and can be viewed as a
product of evolution (p.28/f).
Another interesting point made by the Sociobiology
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Study Group of Science for the People, is that sociobiolo
gists see "the individual as the basic elements
of determito
nation and behavior, whereas society is simply the sum of
all the individuals in it" (p.289)• And they proceed to pre
sent their own viewpoint:

But this confuses cause and effect. Socie
ties evolve because social and economic
activity alter the physical and social
conditions in which these activities oc
cur. Unique historical events, actions of
some individuals, and the altering of con
sciousness of masses of people interact
with social and economic forces to influ
ence the timing, form, and even the possi
bility of particular changes; individuals
are not totally autonomous units whose in
dividual qualities determine the direction
of social evolution (p.289).

Critics Within the Social Sciences:

Marshal Sahlins

distinguishes between the "vulgar

sociobiology and the scientific sociobiology". The vulgar
sociobiology is seen by the author "not so much the work of
V/ilson", but more "as a premise taken up by the New Synthe
sis from certain recent predecessors" n

. And he regards

it as postulating that

human social phenomena are the direct ex
pression of human behavioral dispositions
or emotions, such as aggressiveness, se
xuality, or altruism, the dispositions
themselves having been laid down in the
course of mammalian, primate, or horainid
phylogeny (Sahlins, 1977:2±v;.
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The ’’scientific” sociobiology is viewed by Sahlins as
based on ”kin selection1’, and as a

particularly salient form of the idea that
human social behavior is determined b y a
calculus of individual reproductive suc
cess; that is, that all kinds of sociabi
lity can be explained by the evolutionary
tendency of the genetic material to maxi
mize itself over time (Sahlins, 1977:xiv).

But although the author makes this original distin
ction between ’’vulgar” and ’’scientific” sociobiology, he pro
ceeds to explain that the work of V/ilson (as well as the
works of R.L. Trivers, W.D. Hamilton, R. Alexander, -and M.
V/est-Eberhard), are regarded by him as scientific in the
sense that ”it would take more effort” to recognize in them
’’the thesis of vulgar sociobiology” (p.*f). He says that the
premise of ’’vulgar” sociobiology that ’’there is a one-to-one
V.

parallel between the character of human biological propensi
ties and the properties of human social systems” , is ’’impli
citly, explicitly, and extensively adopted by V/ilson and his
coworkers” (p.5). And he supports his position as follows:
12
Sociobiology
opens with a discussion of
the critical relevance of the hypothalamic
and limbic centers of the human brain, as
evolved by natural selection, to the for
mulation of any ethical or moral philosophy*
These centers are said to 'flood our cons
ciousness v/ith emotions' and to ’orchestrate
our behavioral responses* in such.a way as
to maximally proliferate the responsible
genes. But most generally the thesis of the
vulgar sociobiology is built into the scien-
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tific sociobiologist's idea of social or
ganization (p.5).

V/ith regard to social organization, Sahlins says that
sociobiology looks at the Durkheimian notion of the indepen
dent existence and persistence of the social fact as a
"lapse into mysticism", and it postulates that

Social organization is rather, and nothing
more than, the behavioral outcome of the
interaction of organisms having biological'
ly fixed inclinations (p.5).

From his anthropological view ^

, the author sees

culture as being "biology plus the symbolic faculty" (p.63)?
and that a "theory of meaning" is needed to explain culture
and not biology. He sees biology, or any other "law of na
ture" (physical and chemical laws) as relating to the "fact
of culture",

only as a limit does to a form, a constant
to a difference, and a matrix to a practice.
It will never be possible to explain the
cultural properties of any such fact by re
ferring it to underlying contents af a dif
ferent order (pp.65-66).

Along similar lines Eire Lawrence G. Miller's

11,
^ eirgu-

ments against sociobiology: Miller, examines sociobiology as
a "recurrence of Spencerian evolutionary positivism" (Caplan, 1978:273)? and he sees it as a "sociopolitical state
ment" which "must be seen as one aspect of the contemporary
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search for a biological basis for human behavior” (p*277).
Sociobiology is. compared by the author to other "deterministic" theories, "such as those focusing on I.Q. and the XYY
genotype" (p.277).

According to Miller, evolutionary positivism (of
which sociobiology is seesn as a manifestation),

purports to establish *human nature,1 a con
cept which is inherently ideological in the
sense that it establishes a certain model of
humanity as esential and thus ’natural'. It
may serve to ’explain* crime or aggression,
justify competition, or pronounce impossible
sharing and collective action. Equally im
portant, attention may be deflected from so
cial and political considerations which are
tractable, unlike a genetically based human
nature. Ultimately, the persistence of evo
lutionary positivism can be traced to its
ideological role in legitimating a concep
tion of social order, be it Spencer's lais
sez-faire utilitarianism or V/ilson*s techno
logical social engineering (p.278).

In a further elaboration of the comparison between
Wilson and Spencer, Miller writes that "just as Spencer
soeght a 'true theory of humanity'", so V/ilson, "in modern
jargon, is searching for the human 'biogram* ** (p.275) > which
he detailed as follows:

Both reject the notion of an immutable hu
man essence. Spencer asserted the indefi
nite flexibility of humans, while Wilson is
more circumspect; his human nature includes
aggression, allegiance, love, sexual drives,
and xenophobia. Both point out that human
nature is subject to evolutionary pressure^

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
especially with respect to the development
of altruism. And both begin v/ith similar
premises: human nature is essentially in
dividualist, so only natural selection can
foster altruism (p.275)*

Miller, in general, sees sociobiology as based on
"presuppositions” , and V/ilson*s arguments as involving the
" juxtaposition of common sense and scientific justification"
i

. (p.276). In order to support his conclusion, the author pre
sents the following quotation from V/ilson* s sociobiology. a
quotation which, according to Miller, "explains the behavior
of children in popular twentieth-century fashion" (p.276):

It should be of selective advantage for
young children to be self-centered and re
latively disinclined to perform altruistic
acts based on personal principle. Similar
ly, adolescents should be more tightly
bound by age-peer bonds within their own
sex and hence unusually sensitive to peer
approval. The reason is that at this time
greater advantage accrues to the formula
tion of alliances and rise in status than
later (pp.276-277).

Critics Within Philosophy:

Marjorie Grene

16

addresses the "methodological prob

lems of providing biological explanations for mental pheno
mena" (Gregory, 1978:216). The author sees six methodologi
cal obstacles to explaining mind "in the sense proposed
through reference to evolution in terms of relative fitness"
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(p.216). These "obstacles", as the author states, are: 1)
The theoretical ground of sociobiology (evolutionary biolo
gy through natural selection), "entails" an explanation of
cognitive claims that makes its own cognitive claims "impos
sible" in the form in which it makes them (p.216). The au
thor explains:

For if they carry through their own theory
sociobiologists should recognize that their
A r g u m e n t s , 1 which, like all behavior, are
the effects of evolution in terms of rela
tive fitness, are founded not on reasons for
holding that their statements are credible
but on a tendency toward maximization of re
productive effeciency on the part of some of
their genes. But the same holds for their
critics1 statements. So there is no argument,
only the universal war of gene against gene,
(Gregory, 1978:216).

The author sees, in essence, th!e sociobiological ar
guments - or any other arguments - as tested on universally
accepted "cognitive claims". Sociobiology sees them as test
ed on the genes of the individual. But "this kind of theo
ry", according to Grene, is "epistemologically self-defeat
ing" (p.216), The second point made by Grene is that socio
biology is an "antiquated science" based on Newton*s laws
of causal reasoning. And she rejects this kind of-reasoning:

Rational causal explanation does not fol
low simply from regularity, nor do state
ments about some of the phenomena lead us
with necessity to statements about all of
them. Moreover, in addition to its naive
acceptance of regularity as yielding exp
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lanation, Newton,s naive atomism, too is
retained in sociobiological thinking:
Genes replace hard, solid, impenetrable
particles as ultimate units (p*21?).

The third point made by Grene is that Wilson "assumes”
the "absorption of the human into the natural world" (p*217).
This, according to Grene, is attempted by sociobiology by
"the reduction of all standards, purposes, or duties - all
to which we owe allegiance - to the blind bombardment of par
ticles by one another" (p.218).

Fourth, sociobiology - by purporting to answer philo
sophical questions about mind by specifying necessary biolo
gical conditions for its evolution - confuses "necessary"
with "sufficient" conditions (p.219)*vGrene, states that to
"discover the biological conditions for mental development
is not to say how, within those conditions, mind works (p.
219).

i

Fifth, the study of the brain entails "much more" than
the concepts permitted by evolutionary theory* The author
writes: "evolutionary explanation provides necessary condi
tions for the existence of a phenomenon, not an understanding
of the phenomenon itself" (p*220)•

The final (sixth), point - or obstacle - which the au
thor calls the "gravest error" of a sociobiological approach,
is the "failure" of sociobiologists to understand "the nature
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of artifactual symbol systems and of human beings as animals
dependent for theirpeculiar life-style on the existence of
such systems; One could say, for short, its failure to under
stand the way in which mind is an expression of culture" (p.
220).

In concluding, Grene states that mind - with its ca
pacity to acquire the ability to enter into symbol-consti
tuting and symbol-constituted activities - is "irreducible
to its biological and in particular to its ganetic condi
tions" (p.22Zf).

Another philosopher, Anthony Quinton

"agrees" with

the "anti-naturalists" that there can be no well-founded evolutionary ethics as traditionally understood and that,

the evolving and naturally selected human
characteristics which are principally re
levant to ethics and social policy are so
cially acquired and not genetically inhe- .
rited (Caplan, 1978:137).

Quinton states that, "on the whole" it seems reason
able enough to suppose that the internal details of indivii

dual moral capacity are acquired by a process of social evo
lution, and so are amenable to the type of explanation of
fered by Freud*s super-ego theory, but that if the broad in
stinctive substructure of men has evolved at all within the
life-span of the species and is not part of the initial ge
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netic equipment of homo sapiens, Irit may well have done so
geneticall" (p. 138)*

Teilhard De Chardin:

Relevant to the present discussion, although not a
reaction to sociobiological postulates, are the writings of
Teilhard De'Chardin ^

. The French naturalist ^

philoso

pher accepts Darwin1s evolutionary theory, but he sees the
English scientist - and his adherents, the materialists as well as their counterparts, the “upholders of a spiritu
al interpretation",• as "fighting" on "different planes"* And
he suggests that the two points of view should be "brought
into union",
I

in a kind
physic in
things as
the world
(Chardin,

of phenomenology or generalised
which the internal aspect of
well as the external aspects of
will be taken into account
1965:53).

Chardin, in leading the way towards such a unity, be
gins by defining matter as consisting of three faces: Plura
lity, Unity and Energy (p*40), with energy being at the be
ginning and at the end of evolution* But his idea of energy
deviates from the definition of energy by the physicist.
Chardin does not see enrgy only as a "unifying power" but as
the "expression of structure" as well. This prompts him to
describe energy as:
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that floating, universal entity from v/hich
all emerges and into v/hich all falls back
as into an ocean; energy, the new.spirit;
the new god. So, at the world's Omega, as
at its Alpha, lies the Impersonal (Chardin,
1965:258).
i

For Chardin, energy is synonymous to mind, soul, spirit or consciousness. In defining energy as consciousness he
writes:

The initial quantum of consciousness con
tained in our terrestrial world is not
formed merely of an aggregate of parti
cles caught fortuitously in the same net.
It represents a correlated mass of infi
nitesimal centres structurally bound to
gether by the conditions of their origin
and development (pp. 73-7k ).

This energy (or intelligence, spirit,, consciousness),
evolves through "the natural phenomena of the 'change of
state'" (p.169), and through "a psychical kindling or con
centration" (p.169), from intelligence to the atom, from the
atom to the cell and from the cell to the thinking animal.
The highest form of thinking animal is the human (p.170),
and its evolution terminates in the noosphere, after which
involution begins. In summarizing his explanation of the
above evolutionary steps the author writes:
\

we have been following the successive steps
of the same grand progression from the fluid
contours of the early earth. Beneath the
pulsations of geo-chemistry, of geo-techto- .
nics and of geo-biology, we have detected one
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and the same fundamental process, always
recognisable - the one which was given
material form in the first cells and was
continued in the construction of ijervous
systems. V/e saw geogenesis promoted to
biogenesis, which turned out in the end
to be nothing else than psychogenesis
(p.181).

Psychogenesis, the author continues, "has led" to
man. Specifically, with regard to the evolution of humans,
* Chardin writes:

The more we find of fossil human remains
and the better v/e understand their ana
tomic features and their succession in
geological time, the more evident it be*comes, by an unceasing convergence of all
signs and proofs, that the human fspecies1,
however unique the ontological position
that reflection gave it, did not, at the
moment of its advent, make any sweeping
change in nature. Whether we consider the
species in its environment, in the mor
phology of its stem, or in the global
structure of its group, v/e see it emerge
phyletically exactly like any other species
tp. 18i).

.'But all this changes, according to Chardin, with the
"awakening of thought" (p.181). The awakening of thought
gives rise to the "noosphere" (p.180-18/*), which sets man
apart from other animals and towards the ultimate of concep1Q
tions: Omega point 7 .

Chardin goes further and compares what he calls Ome
ga point with the Christian god. Hewrites:.
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In one manner or the other it still remains
true that, even in the view of hte mere bi
ologist, the human epic resembles nothing
so much as a way of the Cross (p.313)*
\

This,of course, does not cast the author with the side
of the theological explanation of the human nature. And such
an affiliation does not arise from his explanation of the
human evolution. But Chardin does not conclude his discussion
here. He proceeds further to claim the lrprimacy of the spi
rit” (p.309)* He suggests that at the "origin” of life the
focus of "arangement", in each individual element, "engen
ders” and "controls” its related "focus of consciousness” .
But, higher up, the "equilibrium is reversed". The focus of
consciousness, or intelligence, begins to "take charge". And
still higher,

(at the approaches of "collective reflection"),

the focus of consciousness is "breaking away from its temporo-spatial frame to Join with the supreme and universal fo
cus Omega" (p.309)*

NOTES

1. Edward 0. V/ilson, introducing the book sociobiolor;y and
human nature, edited by Michael S. Gregory, Anita Silvers
and Diane Sutch, and published by Jossey-Bass, San Eran-
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\

cisco, U.S.A., 1978
2„. Among others, Waddington writes: This book will undoubtetly be for many years to come a major source of infor
mation about all aspects of our knowledge of social be
havior in animals, from the most primitive types such as
corals, through insects, fishes, birds, to the many va
rieties of mammals and primitive man. It has also some
of the clearest discussions yet written of recent advan
ces in general population biology and demography. Many
large drawings illustrate the major aspects of social t'
behavior in various groups of animals with exemplary
clarity. (Caplan, 1973:2540.
In addition to Waddington, Michael Ruse, in the in
troduction to his book Sociobiology: Sense or nonsense?
describes Wilson as a ’‘distinguish Harvard entomologist"
who presented in the Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.
"the most thorough and inclusive treatment possible, be
ginning in the animal world with the ost simple forms,
and progressing via insects, lower invertebrates, mam
mals and primates, right up to and including our own spe
cies, Homo sapiens" (Ruse, 1979:1).
3. Quoted from Lawrence G. Miller's article "Fated Genes",
first published in the Journal of the History of the Be
havioral Sciences (April, 1976, pp.183-190). The quota
tions used here were taken from the book The Sociobiolo
gy Debate (edited by Arthur L. Caplan), where the arti
cle was reprinted (pp. 269.-279) •
4-. Waddington is a biologist, noted especially for his book
The Strategy of the Genes: A Discussion of Some Aspects
of Theoretical Biology. George Allen and Unwin, London,
-England, 1937* Here the reference is to Waddington1s ar
ticle "Mindless Societies", first published in the Hew
York Review of Books (August 7, 1975), and reprinted in
Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate. 1978 (pp. 252-258).
5* V/addington, as he says, is referring to J.3.S. Haldane's
book The Causes of Evolution, published in 1932* Among
others, Haldane writes: "Insofar as it makes for the
survival of one's descendants and near relations, altrui
stic behavior is a kind of Darwinian fitness, and may be
expected to spread as a result of natural selection" (P.
131). Cited in Caplan (1978:254-).
6. "The Human Condition", Sociobiology and Human Nature.
1978
7. Cited in Arthur L. Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate, Har
per & Row, New York, U.S.A., 1978 (pp.259-264)•
8 . The group of these academicians is otherwise known as The
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Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, and
they published another article in BioScience (March,
1976, 2 6 , No.3), to which reference will be forthcoming*
9. The authors base this opinion on the following characte
ristics of human nature"^ as presented in Wilson's socio
biology; l) Territoriality and tribalism, 2) Inaoctrinability, 3) Spite and Family chauvinism, 4) Reciprocal
altruism, 5) Blind faith, 6 ) Warfare (Caplan, 1978:282)*
10. The Use and Abuse of Biolog?/'. 1977
11. The "predecessors" are cited as Ardrey, Lorenz, Morris,
Tiger and Fox (Sahlins, 1977:*f) •
12. HereSahlins means Wilson's book sociobiology: The New
Synthesis (1975a).
13. Sahlins»s book is subtitled: An Anthropological Critique
of Sociobiology.
1if. First published in the Journal of the History of the Be
havioral Sciences (April 1976:183-190). The quotations
used here are taken from the book The Sociobiology De
bate (edited by Arthur L. Caplan), where the article was
reprinted (pp.2 6 9 - 2 7 9 ).
13. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1970
16. "Ethics and the Theory of Evolution", in Caplan's The So
ciobiology Debate. 1978 (pp. 117 - W ) •
17. The Phenomenon of M a n . 1963
18. He regards himself as naturalist (Chardin, 1963:39)*
19* The Omega point is defined as the "point" at an intelli
gently "higher order" where the "convergent beams of
millions of elementary centres dispersed over the surface
of -the thinking earth" (Chardin, 1965:259)*
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WILSON'S RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS
AND OTHER COMPATIBLE VIEtfS

As a response to several criticisms.Edward O, Wilson
stepped forward to make certain clarifications, expositions
and - sometimes - modifications of his earlier positions.
One such occasion was his letter published in The New York
Review of Books

which was an answer to the "false state

ments and accusations that comprise the letter signed by Elizabeth Allen and 15 co-signers in the November 13 New York
Review of Books" ( Caplan, 1978:265) ^ • Among the points he
makes are the following:

1. The claim that Sociobiology: The New Synthesis is an attempt to "reinvigorate the
ories" which in the past, through "euge
nics policies" led to the establishment of
"gas chambers in Nazi Germany," is an "ug
ly, irresponsible, and totally false accu
sation" (Caplan, 1978:265)*
2. Comparisons, in literal terras, between the
behavior of other organisms and humans
should be avoided. In this case, "slavemaking" in ants can not offer to huraans
"any moral or political lesson" (p.266).
3. Wilson's sociobiology is "far closer" to
40
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Dobzhansky's statement that “In a sense
human genes have surrendered their pri
macy in human evolution to an entirely
ew non-biological or superorganic agent,
culture” , than to “the opposite position”
(p.266).
if* The “pivotal indictment” by Allen et al.
that “Wilson joins the long parade of
biological determinists” is false (here
the author cites his article in the New
York Times Magazine - October 12, 1975 Y/here he suggests that in sociobiology
there is the trap of “the naturalistic
fallacy of ethics, which uncritically
concludes that what is, should be* The
■what is' in human nature is to a large
extent the heritage of a Pleistocene
hunter-gatherer existence” . And later
on: “genetic biases can be trespassed,
passions averted or redirected, and e~
thics altered"), (p.267)*
5. The mind is not “infinitely malleable"*
“Human sociobiology should be pursued
and its findings weighed as the best
means we have of tracing the evolutio
nary history of the mind. In the dif
ficult journy ahead, during which our
ultimate guide must be our deepest and,
at present, least understood feelings,
surely v/e cannot afford an ignorance of
history” (p.267).

In another occassion

3

, V/ilson redefines redefines

sociobiology and emphasizes more the human study in the di
scipline :

Sociobiology is defined as the systematic
study of the biological basis of all forms
of social behavior, including sexual and
parental behavior, in all kinds of orga
nisms, including humans (Gregory, 1978:2).
And he continues:
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Sociobiology consists mostly of zoology.
About 90 percent of its current material
concerns animals, even though over 90
percent of the attention given to socio
biology by nonscientists, and especially
journalists, is due to its possible ap
plications to the study of human social
behavior (p.2 ).

In an apparent response to the several objections of
the application of sociobiology to the study of humans, Wil
son writes the following:

There is nothing unusual about deriving
principles and methods, and even termi
nology, from intensive examinations of
lower organisms and applying them to the
study of human beings. Most of the funda
mental principles of genetics and bioche
mistry applied to human biology are based
on colon bacteria, fruit flies, and white
rats* To say that the same science can be
applied to human beings is not to reduce
humanity to the status of these simpler
creatures (pp.2-3 ).

The author proceeds by dealing with what he calls
"the strongest redoubt of counterbiology": Mentalism. He
notes the following:

<

It is difficult - for some it is impos
sible to envision the existence of the
mind and the creation of symbolic thought
by biological processes. 'The human mind,'
this argument often goes, 'is an emergent
property of the brain that is no longer,
tied to genetic controls. All that the genes
can prescribe is the construction of the
liberated brain' (p.9 ).
Y/ilson disagrees with this position:
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But the relation between genes, the brain
and the mind is only a practical difficul
ty, not a theoretical one. Models have al
ready been produced in neurobiology and
cognitive psychology that allow at least
the possibility of mind as an epiphenomenon of complex but essentially conventio
nal neuronal circuity. Consciousness might
well consist of large numbers of coded
abstractions, some fed stepwise through a
hierarchy of integrating centers whose
lowest array consists of the primary sense
cells, others originating internally to si
mulate these hierarchies (p.9).

In further discussion, the author sees the mind as a
possible "republic of alternative schemata," which are prog
rammed to compete for control of the decision centers, "in
dividually waxing and waning in power according to the rela
tive urgency of the needs of the body" (p.9). And he conti
nues to make "his" point:

My point is that it is entirely possible
for all known components of the mind, in. eluding will, to have a neurophysiological basis subject to genetic evolution by
natural selection. There is no a -priori
reason why any portion of the foundation
of human social behavior must be excluded
from the domain of sociobiological analy
sis (p.10).

Finally, responding to the "remarkably harsh" response
of the Science for the People Group ^ , V/ilson writes that
these criticisms are "an example of what Kans Kung (1976) has
called the fury of the theologians" (p.2). Wilson sees the
application of evolutionary theory to social systems as "an
extension of the great Western tradition of scientific mate-
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rialisra" (Gregory, 1978:2), And, as such, “it threatens to
transform into testable h 5rpothese& the assumptions about hu
man nature made by some Marxist philosophers” (p.2),

David P. Barash:

David P. Barash ^ is one of the defenders of sociobi
ology, for which he attempted to build a case. Specifically,
in responding to criticisms that sociobiology is racist, he
writes:
/
Concern has been expressed that human so
ciobiology represents racism in disguise:
This is simply not true. Sociobiology deals
with biological universals that may under
lie human social behavior, universals that
are presumed to hold cross-culturally and
therefore cross-racially as well. What bet
ter antidote for racism than such emphasis
on the behavioral commonality of our single
species (Barash, 1977:278)?

The author states that when there is supporting evi
dence that human behavior has biological foundations, this
does not mean "condoning" the behavior in question:
V

Sociobiology searches for the biological
foundations of social behavior. When eva
luations of this sort are made for human
behaviors and supporting evidence is pre
sented, this may be misread as somehow
condoning the behaviors in question. Again,
this is nonsense: Ethical judgements have
no place in the study of human sociobiology
or in any other science for that matter.
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V/hat is biological is not necessarily
good, assuming here that human social
behavior is in fact found to have a
valid evolutionary substrate. Diseases
are part of our biology; this does not
imply that they are good. V/e study pneu
mococci, seeking further understanding
of hov/ they are put together and why they
do v/hat they do; this does not imply
that we approve of pneumonia (pp.278-279)•

Barash continues by saying that Homo sapiens is a
* J’di'fficult creature*' and the social sciences, in studying
their subject matter, need "all the help they can get":

The task of unraveling such a difficult
creature as Homo sapiens is so awsome that
the social sciences need all the help they
can get. They should leave no stone un
turned, no tool unused in pursuit of any
thing that might offer further insight;
and, considering the explanatory and pre
dictive power of evolutionary theory when
applied to the social behavior of other
living things, application of this evolu
tionary approach"to human behavior seems
eminently sensible. If biology seems arro
gant in seeking to include humans within
its scope, think of the greater arrogance
of a social science that refuses help v/hen
it is offered (pp.276-277)*
J

'With regard to substantive areas of sociobiology, the
author deals, among others, with "one of the oldest and least
productive debates in the history of science", namely, the
debate concerned with the "underlying causes of behavior",
and manifested in the conflict which "has been variously des
cribed as instinct versus learning, nature versus nurture, or
endogenous versus exogenous control of behavior" (p.39). Bio-
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logists, "particularly ethologists**, according to Barash,
and social scientists, "particularly psychologists", engaged
in rather "acrimonious" debate , "with the biologists favor
ing genetic influences and the social scientists emphasizing
the role of learning, culture, and other environmental modi
fiers of behavior** (p.39)* The debate of nature versus nur
ture or instinct versus learning, is seen by the author as
■ culminating into a ‘'compromise synthesis", because - as the
author suggests - "like most dichotomies, the either-or que
stion was essentially meaningless" (p.39)* According to this
"comromise", as endorsed by Barash,

it makes no sense to consider an animal’s
development and behavior in the absense of
an environment; likewise, the extreme of
environmentalists’ claims would posit an
environment without any organism. In short,
all phenotypes derive from the interaction
of an organism's genetic potential with its
environment, and behavior is as good a phe
notype as any other,(p.39).

The concept of phenotype, introduced here by the au
thor, occupies an important position in the sociobiological
explanation of behavior. As earlier defined by him, an orga
nism's phenotype "is any actual, directly observable chara
cteristics of an organism - such things as size, color, or
shape and anything we can measure or count, from structure
to behavior" (Barash, 1977:13)

6

•

The relative contributions of genotype (the organism’s
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genes or “genetic potential” ), and environment may vary “con
siderably", according to Barash, but neither*s contribution
is ever “equal to zero11 (p.JfO). Proceeding from here, the au
thor constructs a model in which he places the organisms ac.cording to the differencial influence on their behavior of
the genotypic and environmental factors. On the one extreme,
with the highest influence of genotypic factors and the low
est influence of environmental factors are the insects, fish,
reptiles and birds (in that order)• At the other end, with
the highest influence of the environmental factors and the
lowest influence of the genotypic ones, are the human beings
and the non-human mammals (p.ij-1).

By referring to artificial selection and hybridization
studies among fruit flies (Hirsch, 1963* Manning, 1965)* mice
dogs, cats, horses etc. (Barash, 1977:A5), the author con
cludes that the evidence supporting the correlation between
genes and behavior is “overwhelming" (p.A7)* And for those
for whom this correlation “still appears perplexing", .Barash
presents another - this time “mechanistic” - viewpoint:

the DNA of which genes are composed speci
fies the production of prodeins, leading to
the various structures constituting an or
ganism. These structures include bone, muscle,
gland, and nerve cells. Behavior unquestio
nably arises as a consequence of the activity
of nerve cells, which presumably are suscep
tible to specification by DNA, just any other
cells. Accordingly, insofar as genes specify
the organization of nerve cells, just as they
specify the organization of bone cells, there
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is every reason to accept a role of genes
in producing behavior, just as we accept
a role of genes in producing structure (p.

4-7) .

With regard to the derivation of answers concerning
the correlation between behavior and genes in the human do
main, the author points to the “serious problem" arising
from the fact that “we cannot experimentally manipulate
genes and vary environments at will among humans so as to
isolate causative factors, as we can among non-humans“ (p.
281)• And he concludes:

Therefore v/e must content ourselves with
descriptions of what actually occurs in
human behavior, often being unable to par
cel these phenotypes to social experience
or evolution (p.28l),

Pierre L. van den Berghe:
n

Pierre L. van den Berghe r is another defender of so
ciobiology, although his position comes closer to the brid
ging of the gap between genetic and environmental approaches
in the determination of human social behavior. The author
does not see sociobiology as the antithesis of the "cultu
rally deterministic" position adopted by “many" social scien
tists. He writes:
Sociobiology, be it noted, is not the anti-
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thesis of the culturally deterministic
position just outlined. Sociobiologists
are quite happy to recognize that .human
species is unique in some important re
spects. So, for that matter, is every
species; otherwise it would not be a spe
cies. Humans, in short, are not unique
in being unique. Nor do sociobiologists
deny the importance of human conscious
ness and culture and the effect these
have in greatly accelerating processes
of human adaptation to and modification
of the environment (Gregory, 1973:^1)•

Where sociobiologists differ, according to van den
Berghe, is on the emphasis they place on biological evolution,
. without which the human attributes are "incomprehensible".The
author sees both "heredity and environment, nature and nur
ture, the inborn and the learned" as being "only two faces of
the same interactive reality" (p.Zf2 ).

Van den Berghe regards the place of social scientists
i

"as specialists in one species that happens to be uniquely
dear to us" as safe and "assured". But he suggests:

If the social sciences are ever to achieve
scientific status, however, they cannot
continue to dangle in an evolutionary va
cuum, isolated from the natural sciences
(p.*f2).

The author suggests, in responding to claims that so
ciobiology is a defender of the status quo, that the new
discipline is, in contrast to these accustations, a "challe
nge for change":
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Socio'oiology predicts that we shall con
tinue to reproduce, consume resources, and
destroy each other with abandon because we
are programmed to care only about ’ourselves
and our relatives. So far, there is little
evidence to show that sociobiology is
wrong. The ultimate challenge of humanity
is to prove sociobiology wrong, not by
assertion but through self-conscious change
in our behavior. Far from being an apology
for the status quo, sociobiology is a chal
lenge for change. The more v/e learn about
the kind of animal we are, the more selfconscious our behavior will become; and the
more self-conscious we are the more effec-. •
tively v/e can change in the direction we
choose (p.52).

NOTES

1. Published in the issue of December 11, 1975* Quotations
used here are taken from Arthur C. Caplan’s The Sociobio
logy Debate. 1978, v/here the letter was reprinted (pp.
£ 65-268)

.

2. Excerpts from A.llen’s letter were cited earlier.
5- In the introduction to Gregory’s book Sociobiology and
Human Nature, 1978 (pp. 1-12).
4-. The criticisms by Allen et Al., cited earlier, and other
criticisms by Marxists.
5* Sociobiology and Behavior. 1977
6. Wilson defines phenotype as ’’the observable properties of
an organism as they have developed under the combined in
fluences of the genetic constitution of the individual
and the effects of the environmental factors” (Wilson,
1975a:591).
7. ’’Bridging the Paradigms: Biology and the Social Sciences” ,
Sociobiology and Human Nature . edited by Michael S. Gre
gory. Anita Silvers & Diane Sutch, and published by Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, U.S.A., 1978.
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A SYNTHESIS

The dichotomy of innate versus acquired social beha
vior (as it is presented in the views mentioned in the pre
vious pages), is abandoned by Daniel G. Freedmanl who adopts
a ’'monistic*' view of social behavior, suggesting

^

that we sire totally biological, totally
environmental, that the two are as in
separable as an object and its shadow.
Or, as Hebb (1959) put it, we are 100%
innate, 100% acquired; one might add,
100% biological," 100% cultural (Freedman, 1979:14-1).

,

Freedman wants the "obfuscating" term innate, as well
as the terms instinctive, inborn, unlearned, which are "fun
ctionally synonymous " to innate, to be avoided in "any se
rious

description of behavior", and be replaced by the terms

evolved or uhylogenetically adaptive behavior. This "termi
nological change", the author states, in addition to repla
cing "obfuscating " terms, "will have the secondary advan
tage of bringing evolution into the forefront of our think
ing where it belongs" (p. 1^-3 )•
51
i
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The “genetic” and the “learned11 are seen as insepa
rable by Freedman, who proceeds to adopt the pre-Christian
2
Greek
idea of the unity of body and mind:
v

There is no way to separate the genetic
and the learned fo they are permanently
glued together, and that is true every
where in nature, including man* Logical
ly, anything we do is gene related. If
I think, it is my genetically derived
brain that is thinking and not some dis
embodied mind (p.lVf).

Freedman diagrees with the "many" Western scientists
v/ho believe that “mind is nonbody“ , and he sees “no merit“
in tearing “asunder" mind and body or culture and biology.
And he concludes:

:

Certainly, as you and I negotiate life,
v/e do not have separate cultural and
biological experiences, for experience
is marvelously unitary. Curiously, it
takes an added intellectual step for
modern V/estern man to return to" this
simple view (p.1Zf4)*

. Freedman, here, regards the problem as a philosophi
cal one. In this he agrees with Michael Ruse ^ : Citing
Thomas Kulai ** , with regard to the philosophical* base of
major scientific conflicts, Michael Ruse supports his in
volvement in the sociobiology "controversy" (although a
philosopher), by suggesting that "much of the sociobiolo
gical controversy goes beyond science to matters philoso-
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phical" (Ruse, 1979:3)•

But,identifying the problem as a philosophical one
does not put an end to the conflict between sociobiologists
and social scientists* Marjorie Grene*s ^ wish that, ’*

this particular *new synthesis’ may soon
join the other interesting relics .....
that lie about the lumber room of our in
tellectual history (p.22*f),

is not an answer to the debate. A careful examination of the
positions and counterpositions in the debate is a more like
ly route to its fruitful resolution:

Critics of sociobiology characterize it as "another
biological determinism"

• But the "signs",with regard to

this point, that are coming from the direction of sociobio
logy’s proponents are conflicting:

It is true that Wilson suggests that DNA determines
the organism. This is obvious in the following quotation:

Samuel Butler’s famous aphorism, that the
chicken is only an egg’s"way of making another egg, has been modernized: the or
ganism is only DNA’s way of making more
DNA. More to the point, the hypothalamus
and limbic system are engineered to perpe
tuate DNA (Wilson, 1975a:5).
7
It is true, as well, that Barash f compares the rela>
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tion between genes and nerve cells, as well as the relation
between genes and bone cells, with their relation to beha
vior:

insofar as genes specify the organization
of nerve cells, just as they specify the
organization of bone cells, there is every
reason to accept a role of genes in pro
ducing behavior, just as we accept a role
of genes in producing structure (Barash,
1977:^7).
Q
But it is equally true, as Gregory

notes, that "e-

ven the staunchest sociobiologists do not argue for a oneto-one correlation between gene and behavior1* (Gregory, 1978
286)* The author continues:

They recognize..*••.••••.that behavior is
a transaction between the gene and the
environment. In the literature of socio
biology, behavior is often termed a •phe
notype. and the maxim "Genotype plus en
vironment equals phenotype" is generally
accepted (p.286).

. Wilson and Barash are not exceptions to Gregory*s unq
derstanding of the sociobiologists. For example Wilson
,
in responding to criticisms by Allen et al. ^

that make him

"appear to be the arch hereditarian", he says that he is
"far closer" to Dobzhanky*s statement that *in a sense hu
man genes have surrendered their primacy in human evolution
to an entirely new non-biological or superorganic agent,
culture,* than to the "opposite position" (Caplan, 1973:266)
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An almost identical view is expressed by V/ilson in another
i

instance:

Human behavior is dominated by culture in
the sense that the greater part, perhaps
all, of the variation between societies is
based on differences in cultural experien
ce (Barash,1978:xiv).

Barash

11

, on the other hand, is more categorical in

acknowledging the importance of environment in influencing
behavior* In the following quotation he is satisfied with
only ‘'larger than zero genetic influence” on behavior:

/

No behavior is produced by genotype acting
alone, and,similarly, no behavior is pro
duced by environment alone. The interaction
principle legitimizes sociobiology in that
it argues for a definite role of genes in
mediating behavior, (of course, it also ar
gues equally strongly for a finite role of
environment, and this is not inconsistent.
Sociobiology does not require genetic de
terminism of behavior, only a genetic in
fluence larger than zero). (Gregory,1978:24)*

. Grene

12

notices these conflicting “signs’* coming from

V/ilson. The author writes:

V/ilson himself........seems to have moved
away (V/ilson, 1977) from the more confi
dent (and more dogmatic) theses of his original urogram (V/ilson, 1975a) (Gregory,.
1978:224).

V/hat is needed,therefore, in order to discredit (or
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credit, for that matter), sociobiology is not a reliance on
the conflicting writings of its adherents, but an examina
tions of the postulates on which these adherents claim to
build their theoretical framework. Such an examination points,
first of all, to the concept of natural selection.

Natural selection, according to Wilson ^

, is the

* "central dogma” of evolutionary biology (of which sociobiolo
gy is a branch). Natural selection is regarded as the “light
and the way”. And based on this dogma, the author is “con
vinced" that as all other biological phenomena which are "ex
tensions" of those genes which exist (or v/ere selected), for
their superior adaptive value (or fitness), behavior and so
cial structure are such extensions, as v/ell (V/ilson, 1975a:
21 - 22 ) .
V

/

/

And, if natural selection, the central dogma of socio
biology, is not accepted, the debate over sociobiology becomes futile. This is exactly what happens in the case of the
arguments between creationists and evolutionists. No meaning
ful discussion can take place between the believers in the
devine creation of humans and Darwin's followers in the exp
lanation of the descent of man. From the time the belief in
the supernatural intervention in the operation of the natural
laws interferes with the examination of the interrelation
ships of these laws, the communication breaks down abruptly.
But by casting aside the creationists, the problems
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with regard to the acceptance or rejection of natural sele
ction as proposed by Darwin and as used - as the "central
dogma" - in evolutionary biology, in general, and in socio
biology, in particular, is not resolved. The conflict be
tween the Lamarckian ^

and the Darwinian ^

theories of

evolution, is not resolved-as V/ilson believes (1975a: 117)*
Wilson believes that the"inability" of the Lamarckian theo
ry to account for the existence of sterile organisms proves
to be "truly fatal" to it (p.117). By comparison, by the in
troduction by Darwin of the idea of natural selection ope
rating at the level of the family (the group) the latter*s
theory was saved (p.117)* But this need not be so: Gene mu
tations can very well account for the existence of sterile,
organisms, thus "saving" Lamarck’s theory, as well.

V/ilson himself, it seems, is not certain that the in
ability of the Lamarckism theory to account for the existen
ce of sterile organisms was proven fatal to it. Later on
(V/ilson, 1975a:156), the author comes back to the same prob
lem again in his discussion of the learning process. And he
says that if learning is a generalized process whereby each
brain is stamped afresh by experience, the role of natural
selection must be solely to keep the tabula rasa of the
brain clean and malleable. But he disagrees with this. He
states: "Only small parts of the brain resemble a tabula ra
sa; this is true even for human beings" (p.156).
How small are the "small parts" of the brain which re-
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semble a tabula rasa is debateable. Although Wilson cites
the writings of Niko Tinbergen, Peter Marler, Sherwood Washburn, Hans Kummer, ”and others,” as supporting his thesis,
there are others who support a different position. Besides
Sahlins, Waddington, Allen et al. and the others mentioned
in the section of ”The Critics” , in this study, and who em
phasize
—

the cultural influences and the learning process

in the human social behavior, William H. Durham

16

points

out that the human being is subject, from birth, to two
kinds of selection processes: a) The process of socializa
tion, in which the ”combined interest of the parents, the
child, and even the social group as a whole” is selected,
and 2) The selection of the ”satisfaction” of the organism,
in which genetic advantage for a neurophysiology which re
wards with sensory reinforcement and a feeling of "satisfa
ction” selects those acts likely to enhance survival and
reproduction, and which produced unpleasant, distressing,
or painful feedback in response to potentially dangerous
behaviors (Caplan, 1978:^-31-^32). Proceeding from here, Dur
ham suggests a”coevolutionary synthesis” based on the hypo
thesis that
\

selective retention in biological and cul
tural evolution generally favors those atributes which increase, or at least do not
decrease, the ability of individual human
beings to survive and reproduce in their na
tural and social environments (p.ZfJfl).

Taking into account both the arguments of sociobioloi

,

\

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59
gists, as well as the arguments of their critics - those
who emphasize the “ fact of culture11, or mentalism according
to V/ilson - the "amalgam" points to the direction that if
the concept of natural selection is to survive "unscathed"
in its application to the evolution of humans, culture
should be examined as part of the "natural" agents which
determine selection* This is the first postulate on which
* the present synthesis is based.

Kin selection:

Kin selection is the concept on which the second pos
tulate of this synthesis is based. Kin selection (or family
selection), is the concept which, according to V/ilson

1n

r

"saved" the Darwinian evolutionary theory by explaining
the existence of sterile organisms, an existence which can
not be justified on the notion of the survival of the fit
test (V/ilson, 1975a: 11 ?)• But although kin selection "saved"
Darwin*s theory, it casts doubts on V/ilson*s wisdom in sear
ching for biological bases of social behavior (especially in
humans), in the genes of the individual organisms:

If kin selection is to be accepted, with regard to
the survival and reproduction of the fittest (in which case
the object of natural selection is the kin and not the indi
vidual, who may be sterile), the behavior of the kin - as a
whole - which maximizes its survival and reproduction abi-
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lity should be influenced - or determined - by the colle
ction of the genes of all the organisms comprising the kin,
combined, and not by the genes of individual organisms. Of
course kin, as an entity, does not replace individual be
havior (group behavior is not relevant in this point), but
it does influence the behavior of the individual, who - in
the case of individual selection - would behave otherwise.
Thus, acceptance of kin selection necessitates the abandon
ment of the search for biological bases of social behavior
- at least the kind of behavior which promotes the survival
and reproduction of the kin at the expense of the indivi
dual fitness - in the genes of the individual organism. In
a word, inclusive fitness can not reside with exclusive
genes (the genes of the individual).

But if social behavior can not reside with the genes
of the individual organism, then it should be residing (if
the sociobiological explanation is to be followed), with
the genes of the group. But, of course, such genes do not
exisi. Then, what is left, in order to salvage any “hope"
for sociobiology, is the-insistence - based on unsophisti18
cated logic, which seems to be implied by Wilson
- that,
since natural selection (in the Darwinian theory1s sense),
selected certain genes, instead of others because of their
superior fitness, the selected genes must have characteri
stics which relate them to the selected behavior (characterestics which the non-selected genes lack). But such an un-
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sophisticated logic has a drawback: This argument can not
withstand scrutiny (especially in the macroscopic level in
which, according to V/ilson ^

, sociobiology is iterested).

Examined over long periods of time, natural selection even when culture is taken as an agent in this selection 'the randomness with which the process takes place is appa
rent. For example, when natural selection selected John
D* Rockefeller, Sr., and big business, for survival and re20
production - according to his own claim
- it was only
the short-term interest of Rockefeller, his ancestors and
• descendants that was served. In a possible socialist envi
ronment, Rockefeller1s genes would not be able to survive.
Pointing to this is the fate of the czars.

What is obvious here is that social behavior selects
the genes depending on the space and time that the indivi
dual carrying those genes happens to exist. But if this is
the case, the genetic fitness that,supposedly,is transfered
from generation to generation

becomes irrelevant. This ne

cessitates the search for determinants of social behavior
to be focused on other directions.

Stratified Determinism:

Without violating the tradition of the "great West
ern" scientific materialism, which V/ilson - as he claims -
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follows

21

, and without entering the domain of supernatu

ral explanations, human behavior mau be explained in a different way:

t

Paul A. Weiss

22

, in his discussion of the strati-

fication of living systems, which he sees as ”the gist of
all lessons learned from biology” , states:

Each sub-system dominates its own subor
dinates smaller parts within its own
orbit or domain, as it were, restraining
their degrees of freedom according to its
own integral portion of the overall pat
tern, much as its own degrees of freedom
have been restrained by the pattern of
activities of the higher system of which
it is a part and participant (Koestler,

1968:l/f-15).
Weiss sees this ngist” as being applicable to all
kinds of systems: From the systems of atoms., and molecules
to the living organisms and the universe. And he states
that by analysing the Universe and,

by putting the nieces together again, whe
ther in reality or just in our minds, can
yield no complete explanation of the beha
viour of even the most elementary living
system (p.7).

And, in order to dispel any doubts concerning the meaning
of his words, Weiss proceeds by stating that the principle
of hierarchic order in living nature reveals itself as a
demonstrable descriptive fact, regardless of the philoso-
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phical connotations that it may carry (p.^-).

This is determinism stratified in biological terms in terms which can be analysed, discussed and tested accor
ding to the laws of physics and biology. But in the rela
tionship between the organic system of the individual and
the social group, these laws fail to shed any light. And it
is at that point that sociology enters the debate.

The Sociologists;

'

The "principle of hierarchic order" in its applica
tion to the relationship between humans and the social
group has been debated extensively. Among those who, contri
buted to this debate are Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and
Emile Durkheim:

Auguste Comte

^ recognized this connection between

the organic systems in its application to the relationship
between the individual humans and, what he calls, Humani
ty ^

. And - by attaching to this relationship a hierar

chic order from Humanity down to the individual human beinghe urged humans to "worship" (in the new "demonstrated re
ligion which is about to replace revealed religion"), the
new Supreme Being, that of Humanity (Comte, 1875:327).

Corate saw the existence and the "irresistible power
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of the true Great Being” as exhibited when reflecting on
’’how dependent every part of our life, physical or moral,
is upon time and place” . But he cautions against the danger
of confusing this Great Being with any physical entity. The
nature of Humanity, at a given chronological period - accor
ding to Comte's perception - is the mental inheritance that
all past human generations have handed down to the contem* porary human group, through moral - or otherwise mental precepts. He describes his notion of Humanity as follows:

For Humanity is not composed of all indi
viduals or groups of men, past, present,
and future, taken indiscriminately. There
can be no true whole'unless the elements
composing it are in a true sense assimil
able. Therefore the new Great Being is
formed by the co-operation, whether in ’
time or space, only of such existences as
as are of a kinred nature with itself;
excluding such as have proved merely a
burden to the human race. It is on this
ground that we regard Humanity as composed
essentially of the Dead; these are alone
being fully amenable to our judgement; not
to speak of their increasing superiority
in number••••.•••....The present life is
a period of probation, which after it is
over results either in exclusion or in
permanent subjective incorporation into
the life of Humanity (Comte, 1875:333)•

The significant points in this passage (significant
in terms of the present discussion), are the following: a)
The new Great Being is formed by existences (contributions
by individual humans), which are of kindred nature with Hu
manity. b) Such contributions (or existences), can only be
judged in a macro-level, so only the dead can be subjected
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to such a judgement, c) Since the living humans can not he
judged, their possible existences as being of a kindred
nature with Humanity is on probation.

The similarity between these words and certain reli
gious beliefs concerning God's Ultimate Judgement and the
separation between the immortal and the damned spirits is
apparent. But, without confusing his positivism with super
natural beliefs, Comte makes clear that he is referring by the concept of Humanity - to a mental social heritage,
which may, or may not, characterize social arrangements in
particular chronological periods (specific arrangements and
doctrines are on "probation" until they are subjected to
the judgement of time).
\

t

Herbert Spencer:

Other proponents of the idea that there exist an en
tity characterizing the social group, have not seen the so
cial group as a mental one (especially not as consisting of
the moral heritage handed down by past generations to the
subsequent ones). For example, Herbert S p e n c e r ^ i n his des
cription of society as an organism, writes:

It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows*
its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase
of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously
assume activities of unlike kinds. These acti
vities are not simply different, but their
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differences are so related as to make one
another possible* The reciprocal aid thus
given causes mutual dependence of the
parts. And the mutually-dependent parts,
living by and for one another, form an
aggregate constituted on the same general
principle as is an individual organism.
The analogy of a society to an organism
becomes still clearer on learning that
every organism of appreciable size is a
society; and on further learning that in
both, the lives of the units continue for
some time if the life of the aggregate is
suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate
is not destroyed by violence, its life
greatly exceeds in duration the lives of
its units. Though the two are contrasted
as respectively discrete and concrete,
and though there results a difference in
the ends subserved by the organization,
there does not result a difference in the
laws of the organization: the required
mutual influences of the parts, not tran
smissible in a direct way, being, in a
society, transmitted in an indirect way
(Spencer, 1969:21-22).

It is apparent from the above description that Spenf
>
cer refers to a society comprised of living human beings.
Although his statement that society "undergoes continuous
growth" indicates that Spencer compares societies of dif
ferent chronological periods, this comparison regards these
societies as distinct of each other entities, and no conne
ction is implied between them in terms of a moral code,
which develops - according to Conte - all through the human
history, transcending time and space.

Prom here, Spencer proceeds to deal in a great de
tail with social growth, social structure, social functions,
systems of organs, the sustaining system, the distributing
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system, the regulating system, the social types and consti
tutions, the social metamorphoses

26 .

The distinction between Spencer's society and Com
t e k Humanity is clear: Comte's Great Being marches from
one chronological period to another, integrating in its all
consuming moral code all worthy "existences" and disregard
ing the rest, thus reducing reducing humans to the role of
pilgrims kneeling at the feet of Humanity, Spencer's society is not all consuming. It is a distinct organism indepen
dent of the individual human organism, and, such a concep
tion can lead - as in the case of Spencer - to the idea
that manipulation can take place between the two. This is
an idea which predominates in Spencer's individualist ap
proach to the relationship between the individual and soci
ety. In contrasting his idea of society to that of Comte's,
Spencer2*^ wrote:

M. Comte's ideal society is one in which
government is developed to the greatest
extent - in which class-functions are far
more under conscious public regulation
than now - in which hierarchical organiza
tion with unquestioned authority shall
guide everything - in which the individual
life shall be subordinated in the greatest
degree to the social life.................
That form of society towards which we are
progressing, I hold to be one in which
government will be reduced to the smallest
amount possible, and freedom increased to
the greatest amount possible - one in which
human nature will have become so moulded by
social discipline into fitness for the so
cial state, that it will need little exter-
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nal restraint, but will be self-restraint-,
••••••••••••••one in which individual life
will thus be pushed to the greatest extent
consistent with social life; and in which
social life will have no other end than to
maintain the conpletest sphere for indivi
dual life (Spencer, 1968:17-18)•

_

Although Spencer*s above statement indicates that he
pQ

misunderstood Comte

and that he, himself (at least, in

“ 't

the above passage), does not seem to deviate from Comte's
ideas

pq

7 , he arrived at this conflicting conclusion be

cause he does not seem to make the distinction between the
social organism as consisting ''primarily" of the dead (the
heritage handed down to the living humans by past genera
tions) , which is the idea of the social organism held by
Corate, and his own emphasis of the social organism as the
social, economic, and political arrangements of a society
consisting of living humans. This prompts Stanislav Andreski 3 0 -to write:

Spencer did not succeed in improving upon
Comte, Actually, reading Spencer's essay
'On the Reasons for Disagreeing with M,
Comte', one is struck by the latter's su
periority as a philosopher of science. In
empirical sociology, on the other hand, it
was the other way round; and here Spencer's
theorizing was much more scientific even
when it was mistaken; because he made a se
rious attempt to base his theories on fac
tual information, which is scanty in Comte
(Spencer, 1972:16).

Andreski - in the above passage - clearly indicates
the differences between Comte ans Spencer with regard to
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their relevance to modern sociology; differences which stem
from their differing emphasis placed on the two aspects of
society: a) The moral, which is comprised "primarily" of
past generations (Comte’s Humanity) and b) The materialistic
existence of living humans, which is more emphasized by
Spencer,

This distinction in the understanding of the social
group between Comte and Spencer, lies at the root of the
conflict between the proponents of individualism and those
of socialism: The specific manifestation of society within
a certain chronological period, may seems to emphasize ei
ther the importance of the individual or the importance of
the group. This depends on the specific social, economic
and political arrangements of the period under examination.
It is only when the life of society is examined as tran
scending space and time, that the importance of the group
becomes overwhelming. Under the light of such an examina\

tion, the individual becomes.nothing more than Homo habilis
(early man), with no consciousness or language, philosophy,
science or technology,

Emile Durkheim:

Emile Durkheim ^

, in his contributions to sociolo(

gy,attempts to combine both the views of Comte and Spencer,
This is apparent in his definition of society. He emphasized
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both the moral heritage and the structure, of contemporary
societies in his studies. For exmple, in "The science of
Morality"

32

, in which he discusses the sources and nature

of morality, Durkheim writes:

There is hardly any event of any importance
in society which does not have repercus
sions upon morality and influence it. The
economists, it is true, have only drawn our
attention to certain of these which parti
cularly interest them: but it is easy to generalise the conclusions which they have
arrived at. This being the case, it is just
as impossible to draw a radical,separation
between ethics, political economy, stati
stics and the science of positive law, as
it is to study the nervous system in abstra'
ction from other organs and other functions
(Durkheim, 1972:95)*

In pointing to the difference between his perception
of society and that of Spencer1s, Durkheim wrote:

Whatever efforts the latter Spencer might
have made to overhaul utilitarianism, his
fundamental postulate is still formulated '
in the same way as that of the utilita
rians, holding that the objective of mora
lity is the advancement of the life of the
individual, and that the good and the use
ful are synonymous terms (p.90)*
s

And - in summarizing his perception of society, Durk
heim points out to his belief that morality is the product
of society and not the product of the individual humans who
compose it. Morality, according to Durkheim, is not intrin
sic to individuals but to society:
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Society is not, then, as has often been
believed, a stranger to the moral world,
or something which has only secondary
repercussions upon it; it is, on the con
trary, the necessary condition of its
existence* Society is not a simple aggre
gate of individuals who, when they enter
it, bring their own intrinsic morality
with them; rather, man is a moral being
only because he lives in society, since
morality consists in being solidary with
a group and varies with this solidarity.
Let all social life disappear, and moral
life would disappear with it, since it
would no longer have any objective (p.101).

Durkheim - in his studies of morality - does not re
main in the domain of philosophy, as Comte does. With his
studies of “Suicide" and “The division of labour" (Durkheim,
1972), looks at the contemporary societies in order to esta
blish social "facts" and the relationship between the indi
vidual and society. In this he resembles Spencer who attem
pted to establish the nature of the structure of society.
But with an important difference: Whereas Spencer saw the
-structure of society as deriving through the initiative of
the individual, Durkheim looked at it as the derivative of
the intrinsic nature of society as a sovereign organism.

A S?,rnthesis:

If evolutionary biology (including sociobiology),
accepts - as it claims - that biological evolution is still
an ongoing process, then the human organism is not an "is-
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land” in the sea of evolution. In an evolutionary process
- and in its chronologically transcendent life - there
come chronological periods when the human organism is non
existent, it is in its early stages of birth and develop
ment, it becomes the central focus and, again, it surren
ders priority to more complex forms of life until it be
comes extinct. This is inevitable to happen - sooner or la• ter - in an ongoing biological evolution. Except, that it
is, if the definition of the human organism changes with
the changing evolutionary stages, permitting, thus, the
extension - in time - of the supremacy of the human orga
nism.

Such a changing definition is apparent in the Durkheimian arguments against Hobbes, Housseau and Spencer:
Durkheim accuses them as seeing the individual as being
"the sole reality of the human realm", whereas Durkheim,
himself, sees society as another such human realm which is
"superior" to man (physically, intellectually and morally),
and before which man "bows" (Durkheim, 1972:99-100)*

Durkheim1s definition of the human realm is compati
ble with Comte's Great Being, as well as Weiss's stratified
determinism, and the arguments of all those who emphasize
the role of culture in human social behavior. But this pre
sent the student of human social behavior with the basic
problem of defining what an idividual human being is. As-
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sumptions about human nature, when such a "nature” is de
pendent upon space and time, according to Comte, the other
sociologists (but, of course, the evolutionary biologists
as,well), do not suffice. In an ongoing evolutionary pro
cess in which the humans are included (whether as subjects
or objects, it is immaterial), there is no static human
nature. In an ongoing evolutionary process, space and time
are- inseparable terms in the definition of human nature.
And, above all, in an evolutionary process, the several
stages in the evolution of the organism (which.are, unavoid
ably, related at any given time), must be taken into ac
count, Weiss ^

advice for "stratifying” determinism in the

examination of living systems can not be ignored. Each sub
system, Weiss states, "dominates" its own subordinates
smaller parts within its own orbit or domain, "restraining"
their degrees of freedom according to its own integral por
tion of the overall pattern (Koestler, 1968:1 A— 15)•

If attempts to "tear" the machinery (the genes and
the DNA) down, are successful - as Wilson ^

hopes - the

highest achievement would be the knowledge of a relation
ship between the genes and behavior. Such a knowledge, as
Grene ^

notes does not shed light on the way mind works:

To discover the biological conditions for
mental development is not to say how, wi
thin those conditions, mind works (Gregory,
1978:219).
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But such a knowledge is not a worthwhile enough goal
for sociobiology. V/ilson

sees the role of sociobiology

as a) Attempting to reconstruct the history of the machi
nery and b) To identify the adaptive significance of each
of its functions (V/ilson, 1975a:575)*

Up to now, sociobiology has been unable to make any
inroads in either of the above areas. V/ilson

36

himself

accepts the inability of sociobiology to explain "at best11
more than a Mtiny fraction" of human social behavior. He
writes:

Contemporary general sociobiology might
at best explain a tiny fraction of human
social behavior in a novel manner,(Caplan, 1978:xiii).

Of course, V/ilson hopes for more success in the fu
ture of sociobiology:

Its full applicability will be settled
only by a great deal more imaginative
research by both evolutionary biologists
and social scientists. In this sense the
true, creative debate has just begun
(Caplan, 1978:xiii-xiv).

But in order for sociobiology to achieve a more fruit
ful future, it needs to take into account another type of
DNA: the one that acts in such a way as to influence (or de
termine?), the relations between the members of the group:
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the Socibrain. The collective ways of acting or thinking
which have, according to Durkheim, a reality "outside" the
individuals (Giddens, 1972:71), and which are manifested in
philosophy, science, arts, the communication media etc.).

In order for sociobiology to gain a wider perspective
of v/hat it is looking at, the following concepts are suggested for examination:

Biobody: The "naked" body (literally and metaphorically):
With its natural drives, passions and desires as they have
evolved up to now, and as they keep evolving (and when they
are unaffected by any social constraints and social conven
tions). This the individual that sociobiology, now,is look
ing at, and it hopes to explain its behavior genetically.

Biobrain: This is essentially a part of the biobody as a
mass of neurons situated in the cerebral hemisphere of the
biobody, and which functions primarily as an informer to,
and co-ordinator and integrator of, the drives in order to
enable the biobody to survive and prosper. This is the na
ture of the biobrain when unaffected by the social group
(or sociobiology1s hin), in which case it may become an "agent" of the group at the expense - or for the benefit of the carrying organism.

Sociobody: The socially bound idea of what a human body is
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'(whether it is a soul-carrying device or a plain mass of
flesh), what is "good" and "bad** about the human body and,
generally, the culturally bound beliefs, ideas and opini
ons with regard to the human body. Through the historical
examination of the idea of the sociobody, it could be de
termined which characteristics

of the biobody evolved as

an individual organic necessity and which ones evolved as
social requirement.

Sociobrain; The collective ways of acting and thinking
which have, according to Durkheim, a reality "outside” the
individual (Giddens, 1972:71). The sociobrain comprises all
the social laws and conventions (political ideologies, re
ligious beliefs, social values and norms, arts etc.). It is
important to note that the sociobrain, during its function,
does not coordinate, regulate or integrate the requirements
of the biobody as perceived by the individual, but as per
ceived by the social group as a distinguishable entity (in
effect, the sociobrain "rules" over the sociobody and not
the biobody). And this practice forces the biobody to under
go - eventually - substantial changes in its physique and
function..

In the past, because of the limited scope and the
simplicity of the social realm (sociobrain), humans enjoyed
a high degree of independence (through, both the effortless
inernalization of the social realm and its limited scope).
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But, the expanding sophistication of the sociobrain (espe
cially with regard to scientific and technological develop
ments) , permits an individual numan to master only a tiny
fraction of it, a fact which does not promote individuality
and creates a cybernetic relationship between the individu
al and society based on the Dictatorship of the Sociobrain.

The sociobrain is not independent of either the .bio
body and biobrain or the sociobody. There is a constant in
teraction between them, which is expressed, very clearly,
in the following words by Charles Horton Cooley ^

where an
i

organic relationship between the individual and society is
suggested:

If we accept the evolutionary point of
view we are led to see the relation be
tween society and the individual as an
organic relation. That is, we see that
the individual is not separable from the
human whole, but a living member of it,
deriving his life from the whole.through
social and hereditary transmission as
truly as if men were literally one body
(Cooley, 196V. 35).

In another instance, Cooley

^

cautions against re

garding any of the factors in a social environment as "more
ultimate” than the others, or overlooking ”the subordination
of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to o~
thers” :

The organic view of history denies that
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any factor or factors are more ultimate
than others. Indeed it denies that the
so-called factors - such as the mind,
the various institutions, the physical
environment, and so on - have any real
existence apart from a total life in
which all share in the same way that the
members of the body share in the life of
the animal organism. It looks upon mind
and matter, soil, climate, flora, fauna,
thought, language, and institutions as
aspects of a single rounded whole, one
total growth. Y/e may concentrate atten
tion upon some one of these things, but
this concentration should never go so
far as to overlook the subordination of
each to the whole, or to conceive one as
precedent to others (Barnes, 1970:836).

This view of Cooley is in line with Freedman's ^ 9 p0_
sition that "we are totally biological, totally environmen
tal" (Freedman, 1979:1^1), and that there is no way to sepa
rate the genetic and the learned for they are permanently
glued together" (p. 1^4-). But both Cooley's and Freedman's
views can apply only in cases where the process, as well as
the agents of socialization are constant and monolithic,
permitting thus the uniformity of social influences on. all
the individuals and in different chronological periods. This
i,
is, of- course, impossible in an evolutionary process where
*

both the individual and social "factors" are in constant
change and the relationship between them is - subsequently in continuous reorganization, in their quest for equilibrium.

The ever changing biobody of the individual humans
(according to the evolutionary biology), the ver changing
physical environment (climate, soil, flora, natural resour-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ces), and the constant reorganization of the sociobrain
(changing philosophies, art forms, social institutions,
means of communication), do not promote the idea of a "sin
gle rounded whole11, as Cooley suggests, or a static harmo
nious relationship between these "factors". The dynamic in
terrelationships of the constituent parts of the "Great
Being" lead, inevitably, to the pre-eminence of a certain
part in different chronological periods, Sorokin's ^

dis

tinction between "sensate", "idealistic" and "ideational"
periods in human cultural development•is an example of the
changing pre-eminence of the factors constituting the so
cial group.

Looking at the present chronological period of the
life of humans and their relationship to the sociobrain,
most societies exhibit a pre-eminence of the latter. As
V/ald ^

states, in his rejection of the sociobiological pre

mise that genes are a limiting factor in human social beha
vior, "the limiting factors in modern human performance are
primarily social', economic, and political" (Gregory, 1978:
277).

NOTES

■ ’

1, Human Sociobiology, 1979
2. The idea of the unity of body and mind in the pre-Chri
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stian Greek philosophy was manifested in the popular
saying: "The healthy mind exists only in a healthy body".
3. Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?. 1979
Zf. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970
.5* "Sociobiology and the Human Mind", in Gregory's Sociobio
logy and Human Nature. 1978
6, "Sociobiology - Another Biological Determinism", in Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate. 1978
7* David P. Barash: Sociobiology and Behavior. 1977
8. Sociobiology and Human Nature. 1978, Michael S. Gregory,
Anita Silvers & Diane Sutch (editors)•
9. "For Sociobiology", in Caplan's The Sociobiology Debate.
1978 (pp.265_268).
10. "Against 'Sociobiology'", in Caplan's The Sociobiology
Debate.1978 (pp.259-26^).
11. "Evolution as a Paradigm for Behavior", in Gregory's
Sociobiology and Human Nature.1978
12. "Sociobiology and the Human Mind", in Gregory’s Sociobio
logy and Human Nature.1978
13- Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. 1979 (pp.21-22).
1A. The doctrine that characteristics acquired by an organism
during its life-time can be transmitted to the offspring
(V/ilson, 1975a).
15. The doctrine that evolution proceeds by combinations and
mutations of genes at the time of the conception of the
offspring - in addition to the influence of natural selection which determines which organism will survive and
reproduce.
16. "Toward a coevolutionary Theory of Human Biology and Cul
ture", The Sociobiology Debate. 1978
17. Sociobiology: The Hew Synthesis. 1975
18. Ibid. (p.3).
19. Gregory, Sociobiology and Human Hature. 1978 (p.7).
20. The Sociobiology Debate, 1978 (p.260).
21. Gregory, 1978 (p.2)
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22. "The living system: Determinism stratified", in Beyond
Beductionism, Hutchinson, London, 1968 (Koestler, A.
and Smythies, eds.).
23. System of Positive Polity, 1875
2ij-. As it will be followed, by Humanity Comte does not mean
the social group, but he means the mental history of hu
mans which was regarded as valuable enough to be pre
served, in a moral code, and be transmitted through the
human generations up to the present. This sets Comte in
a different path from Durkheim and, especially, Spencer
(Without considering modern sociology which followes,
primarily, Durkheim*s example).
25. Principles of Sociology. 1969 (edited by Stanislav Andreski), Archon Books.
26* This widespread and far-reaching treatment of social
phenomena by Spencer, prompts Stanislav Andreski to
write that Spencer explained "more clearly, as well as
somewhat earlier, what some of the influential theo
rists of today claim as their discoveries". And he con
tinues: "Spencer not only introduced the concepts of
what is now called 1structural-functionalism1, but also
laid foundations for a cybernetic analysis of social
phenomena; in addition to developing the ideas which in
an inarticulate (and therefore bastardised) form under
lie most of contemporary thinking about such matters as
development* and '•resistance to change* (Spencer, 1 9 6 9 :
xiii).
27- Seasons for Dissenting ‘from the Philosophy of M. Comte.
1968, The Glendessary Press, Berkeley, California, U.S.A.
28. Comte sees the individual human beings as being sub
jected to the overwhelming superiority and power of so
ciety naturally and without force, and without the power
of- government having anything to do with this arrange
ment (here, Marx’s communism comes to mind). This is
most obvious in the concept of moral code.
29- Spencer states, in the above passage, that "human na
ture will become so moulded by social discipline into
fitness for the social state, that it will need little
external restraint, but will be self-restraint". But
this is what Comte’s Great Being is all about. Humanity
governs the individual humans through a moral code, not
through any kind of government. And if there is any for
mal cybernetic (governmental) arrangement between the
individual and society, such a government is the result- and not the cause - of the naturally existing rela- •
tionship.
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30. Herbert Spencer: Structure. Function And Evolution,
1972, (Stanislav Andreski editor).
31. Smile Durkheim: Selected Writings, 1972, Cambridge Uni
versity Press, Cambridge, Great Britain (Anthony Giddens editor).
32. Ibid. (pp.89-107).
32. "The living System: Determinism Stratified", Beyond
Reductionists. Hutchinson, London, 1968 (Koestler, A.
and Smythies, eds.).
33, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, 1973 (p.575)*
3*f. "Sociobiology and the Human Mind", in Gregory*s Socio
biology and Human Nature. 1978
33* Sociobiology: The Nev; Synthesis, 1975
36* In the foreword of Caplan*s book The Sociobiology Deba£ § ,1 9 7 8
7
1

.

3 7 . 'Charles Horton Cooley: Human Nature and the Social Or
der.1964
38. Publications of the American Economic Association, v,
No.2 (3d ser. 190^-), 18. Reprinted in Harry E. Barne’s
An Introduction to the History of Sociology, The Univer
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970 (p.836)•
39* Daniel G. Freedman: Human Sociobiology, 1979*
ifO. Sorokin, Pitirim A, Social and Cultural Dynamics.cited
in Barnes (pp.88^-901).
Zf1, "The Human Condition", in Gregory's Sociobiology and
Human Nature. 1978 (pp.277-282).
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CONCLUSION

Pure sociobiological theory, according to Wilson
(Gregory, 1978:3-^)> does not imply by itself that human
social behavior is determined be genes* It allowe, he sta
tes, for the following three possibilities:

1) That the human brain has evolved to the point
that it has become an equipotential learning machine en
tirely determined by culture. The mind, in other words,
has been freed from the genes. 2) That human social beha
vior is under genetic constraint but that all of the gene
tic variability within the human species has been exhausted.
Hence our behavior is to some extent influenced by genes,
but we all heve exactly the same potential. 3) That the
human species is prescribed to some extent but also dis
plays some genetic differences among individuals. As a con
sequence, human populations retain the capacity to evolve
still further in their biological capacity for social beha
vior (Gregory, 1978:3-*f) r
The author considers it “virtually11 certain that "the
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Qk

third alternative is the correct one” (p.if). Based on this
conviction, Wilson (1975a), proceeds to study the biologi
cal bases of human social behavior* As a result of his
studies, he reaches the "conclusion" that homo sapiens is
a "typical animal species with reference to the quality
and magnitute of the genetic diversity affecting its beha
vior" (p.6)* And he sums up:

If social scientists and sociobiologists
somehow choose to ignore this line of
investigation, they will soon find human
geneticists coming up on their blind side*
The intense interest in medical genetics,
fueled now by n^w methods such as the e~
lectrophoretic separation of proteins and
rapid sequencing of amino acids, has re
sulted in an acceleration of discoveries
in human heredity that is certain to have
profound consequences for the study of
genetics of social behavior (p.7)*

Althoq) Wilson - and sociobiology in general - pro
fess to follow Darwin's evolutionary theory, it seems that
ar some point in time they abandoned the rigorous applica
tion of the rules of evolution in their theorizing: Socio
biology follows the evolutionary process from the appearance
of life on earth,through its evolution to modern man. But,
somehow, at this stage, it sees evolution as coming to an
abrupt end. Man is regarded as a "finished" product, isola
ted from its environmental (including social), surroundings.
Sociobiology isolates man and looks for causal factors in
human social behavior in the genes and the DNA.
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Following Paul A. Weiss in his discussion of the
stratification of living systems, and the "principle of hi
erarchic order11, the search for causes of the human social
behavior at the level of the human genes becomes futile
theoretically. The organic models of society proposed by
Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer are addi
tional support towards the same direction, Teilhard De Char
d i n s "noosphere11 indicates the demise of the genes.

How fal; sociobiology will be able to go in challeng
ing Weiss, the sociologists and Teilhard De Chardin in un
known at present. But theoreticall, at least, sociobiology
does not seem to head towards a bright future. If the Dar
winian theory of evolution is accepted (together with na
tural selection), it follows that the human genes now exist
ing must be able to •permit human behavior acceptable to to
day's social requirements. But to proceed from here, theo
retically, and suggests that - because of the operation of
natural selection - these genes may be limiting, in any de
finitive way, or determining social behavior, it is a leap
of faith.

In looking at the relationship betv/een the social
group and the individual human, it seems that, increasingly,
the individual-in his relationship to the sociobrain - re
sembles the body-cell in its relationship to the individual
human. As the cell represents a consciousless, senseless and
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negligible part of the individual, the future individual in turn - nay become the consciousless, senseless and negli
gible part of Conte's Great Being, But such a fate - if in
the "cards" - can only be envisioned in the distant future.
In'relation to such a future, the "Great Being" is, present
ly, in the stage of its pre-history.

However, the movement towards that direction depends
on the ability of the individual to master information de
riving from the sociobrain. The more information the indi
vidual is able to master, the more the idividual's ability
is enhanced in influencing - or even determining - the na
ture and the direction of the sociobrain. Presently, as
V/ald (Gregory,1978:277),states "the limiting factors in mo
dern human performance are primarily social, economic, and
political". Society's grasp on the individual is chokingtight. But with the development of the silicon chips (those
marvellous devices used in the micro-computers as informa
tion carriers), there is still hope for miracles in the re
lationship between the elements of society (the individual
and the group). The implantation of one or two silicon chips
in the human skull could possibly result to the rebirth of
the individual as an influencing element of the group......

The dictatorship of-the sociobrain, however, is tem
porary in the development of the organism. It takes place be
cause the lower level of the organism (the individual human)
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is still self-sufficient enough to resist the power of the
higher level of the organism. In further growth of society,
when the individual will become more dependent on the higher
level of the organism, the dictatorship will disappear. This
greater dependence, when - and if - comes, it will not be
forcefully imposed on the individual. It will be a natural
development in the growth of the humans from a less comlex

r

to a more complex organism:

THE INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIETY
Society... Virtues...
Justice, Resolution, Moderation...
He counts them one by one:
Justice, Resolution, Moderation.
Society... Virtues...
They give him the "goose bumps";
his stomach gets tied up in knobs;
he feels like a caged eagle...
And he yearns for solitary peaks;
and he yearns for liberty and freedom.
Society... Virtues...
They give him the "goose bumps";
his stomach gets tied up in knobs;
he feels like a caged eagle...
But the revolt is temporary.
The lapse lasts only for a minute:
He remembers the jungle and the predators;
he remembers the spirits and the erinyes;
he remembers'the Merchant of Venice.
And he opens his eyes again:
Society... Virtues...
But they are my Virtues!
But it is my Society!
/

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andreski, Stanislav
Herbert Suencer: Principles of Sociology. Archon
1969
Books, Hamden, Connecticut, U.S.A.
Barash, David P.
Sociobiology and Behavior. Elsevier, New York,
1977
U.S.A.
Barnes, Harry Elmer
An Introduction to the History of Sociology. The
1970
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, U.S.A.
Caplan, Arthur C.
The Sociobiology Debate. Harper & Row, New York,
1973U.S.A.
Chardin, Pierre Teilhard De
The Phenomenon of Man. Harper & Row, New York,
1965
U .S .A . (translated by Bernard Wall).
Cooley, Charles H.
Human Nature and the Social Order,

1964
/"

Comte, Auguste
A General View of Positivism, Robert Speller &
1975
Sons, Hew York, U.S.A.
197^

The Crisis of Industrial Civilization: The Early
Essays of Auguste Comte. Heinemann Educational
Books Ltd., London, England.

1973

The Catechism of Positive RelirdLon. Augustus M.
Kelley, Clifton, New Jersey, U.S.A. (translated
by Richard Congreve).

88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
\

Comte, Auguste
Introduction to Positive Philosophy. The Bobbs1970
Merrill Company, Inc. Hew York, U.S.A. (Frederick
Ferre, editor and translator).
1987

Positive Philosoph?/ of Auguste Comte, Calvin Blan
chard, New York, U.S.A.

1875

System of Positive Philosophy. Burt Franklin, New
York, U.S.A.

1858

Positive Philosophy, Calvin Blanchard, New York,
U.S.A. (translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau).

Delfgaauw, Bernard
Evolution: The Theory of Teilhard De Chardin. Har1969
per & How, New York, U.S.A. (translated by Hubert
Hoskins).
Durkheim, Emile
On Morality and Society: Selected Writings. The
1973
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, U.S.A. (Ro
bert IT. Bellah, editor).
1972

Durkheim Emile: Selected Writings. Cambridge Uni
versity Press, Cambridge, England (Anthony Giddens
editor and translator).

Faris, Robert E.L., and Dunham H. Warren
Mental Disorters in Urban Areas, Hafner Publishing
1960- Co., New York, U.S.A.
Fletcher, Ronald
The Making of Sociology. Michael Joseph Ltd., Lon1971
'don, England (two volumes).
Freedman, Daniel G.
Human Sociobiology. The Free press, New York,
1979
U.S.A.
Gehlke, Charles Elmer
Emile Durkh_____________________________
Durkheim1s Contributions to Sociological
1968
Theory. Ams Press, Inc. New York, U.S.A.
Gregory, Michael S., Anita Silvers & Diane Sutch
Sociobiology and Human Nature. Jossey-Bass Publi1978
shers, San Francisco, U.S.A.
Hirsch, J.
"Behavior genetics and Individuality Understood",
1963
Sience. 1^2: 1*f3& - 1 W

(

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

Kuhn, T.S.
1970

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago
University Press, Chicago, U.S.A. (2nd edition).

Lazarsfeld, P.F.
Main Trends in Sociology^ George Allen & Unwin
1970
Ltd., London, England
Manning, A.
"Drosophila and the Evolution of Behavior", View19 65
points in Biology, Butterworth, London, England
(pp. 12>-169). J. Carthy and C. Duddington, eds.
Mill, John Stuart
Auguste Comte and Positivism. The University of
1965
Michigan Press, Michigan, U.S.A.
Motwani, Kewal
A Critique of Emuiricisra In Sociology.-Paragon
1967
Book Gallery, Ltd., New York, U.S.A.
Mullen, Bradley G.
"Sociobiology: A New Synthesis?", Sociological
1981
Focus, vol. 14, No. 1, January, 1981•
Nisbet, Robert
The Sociology of Emile Durkheim. Oxford University
1974
Press, Oxford, England.
Plato
1973

The Republic of Plato. Oxford University Press,
New York. U.S.A. (translated by Francis Macdonald
Cornford).

Rocher, Guy
A General Introduction to Sociology. The Macmillan
1972
Company of Canada, Toronto, Canada
Ruse,'Michael
Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?. D. Reidel Publi1979
sliing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
Sahlins, Marshall
The Use And Abuse of Biology. The University of
1977
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.
Sorokin,
1941

Cultural Dynamics, vols. I - III, New
York, 1937 (vol. IV, 19^1)•

Spencer, Herbert
Structure, Function and Evolution. Thomas Nelson
1972a and Sons Ltd., London, England.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spencer, Herbert
Herbert S~oencer On Social Evolution: Selected
1972b
Writings, The University of Chicago Press, Chi
cago, U.S.A. (J.D.Y. Peel, editor).
1971

Structure, Function and Evolution. Michael Jo
seph, London, England

1968

Peasons for Dissenting From the Philosophy of M.
Corate and Other Essays. The Glendessary Press,
Berkeley, U.S.A.

1967

The Evolution of Society. The University of Chi
cago Press, Chicago, U.S.A. (Robert L. Carneiro
editor).

1893

Social Statics and The Man Versus The State, D.
Appleton and Co., New York, U.S.A.
\

Thompson, Kenneth
Auguste Comte: The Foundation of Sociology. Tho1976
mas Nelson and Sons Ltd., London, England
Wilson, Edward 0.
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard Univer1975a sity Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts., U.S.A.
1976

''Academic Vigilantism and the Political Signifi
cance of Sociobiology” , Bioscience. 26, no. 3
(March,1976), pp. 183, 187-190 (reprinted in Arthur L. Caplanjs The Sociobiology Debate).

Wolff, Kurt H.
Emile Durkheim. 1858-1917. The Ohio State Univer1960
sity Press, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

V ITA

Andreas

Constantinides

Date

Birth:

Place

of
of

Birth:

AUCTORIS

October

8,

1944

Cyp rus

Cit iz e n s h i p :

Canadian

Education:

Secondary
Cyp rus
Sheridan
On ta r i o

School,
College,

Nicosia,
Brampton,

U n dergraduate Studies
U n i v e r s i t y of W i n d s o r
B .A . F a l l 1976

at

the

G r a d u a t e S t u d i e s at the
U n i v e r s i t y of W i n d s o r
1979-81
S e v e r a l p u b l i c a t i o n s on S o c i a l
T h e o r y (in G r e e k ) p u b l i s h e d in
Nicosia, Cyprus

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

